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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, world attention has
focused on the future of the new independent states (NIS) in Central and Eastern Europe.
Ukraine has been of particular importance because, in becoming an independent state, it
has completely changed the geopolitics of Eastern Europe. Ukraine's independence
pushed Russian borders 500 miles to the east and limited Russia's access to the Black Sea.
Since 1991, Ukraine and Russia were unable to sign a Friendship Treaty
recognizing each others borders. The signing of this treaty has appeared imminent since
1993, but was always delayed—most recently in October 1996. A series of contentious
issues emerged which cast doubt not only on Ukraine's stability and future existence, but
also on Russia's. All the post-Soviet Union arrangements were in question. After almost
six years of negotiations, insult, and conflict, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma signed the treaty on 3 1 May 1997. In the end, it was
NATO enlargement that forced Russia to sign the treaty and to recognize Ukraine as an
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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, world attention has
focused on the future of the new independent states (MS) in Central and Eastern Europe.
Their survival has depended on Russia's recognition of existing and inviolable borders
between itself and the republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Ukraine has been of
particular importance to Russia because, in becoming an independent state, it has
completely changed the geopolitics of Eastern Europe. Ukraine's struggle for
independence pushed Russian borders 500 miles to the east. Ukraine has limited Russia's
access to the Black Sea. Sherman Garnett best describes why this country is important:
"Ukraine is the keystone in the arch of the emerging security environment in Central and
Eastern Europe." 1
Russian national security interests in Ukraine include culture; language; the
strong Russian diaspora on the Crimean peninsula, as well as in eastern Ukraine; extensive
economic links: defense industry, agriculture, energy, and military early warning radar
systems; basing rights at Sevastopol; the Black Sea Fleet; and Ukraine's strategic and
crucial geographic location. The region is full of precious resources: Donetsk and
Kherson coal, Katerynoslav steel, Kharkiv industry, agriculture products (e.g., wheat, salt,
tobacco, wine and fruits), and the Crimean peninsula's vacationing resorts.
1 Sherman W. Garnett, The Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of
Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997),
7.
IX
Ukraine has similar vital interests in Russia which directly impact on regional
stability. Ukraine depends on Russia for its energy. The industrial complexes require
equipment and parts from Russia. Many soldiers who declared Ukrainian citizenship and
service in the military are Russian. The country is home to a mix of ethnicities that has
made Ukraine's pursuit for recognized independence difficult. Russians and Russian
speakers largely populate the eastern region of Ukraine, including Crimea.
US engagement in Ukraine has made a significant difference. Even though the
presence and control of nuclear weapons in Ukraine were the causes for initial American
involvement, US leaders now realize Ukraine's significance for stability in the region. The
United States responded to the decline of communism with a "Russia first" policy
elaborated in 1992-93. This policy essentially disregarded the new East European states'
desires for independence without Russian dominance. In 1993, the United States took an
active involvement in the negotiations for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. Its consistent
participation evolved into the US-Russian-Ukrainian Trilateral Agreement in January
1 994, which provided Ukraine security assurances in exchange for the dismantling and
destruction of all its nuclear weapons. In 1996, US policy changed to support the
development of "geopolitical pluralism" in the region. President Clinton's current
National Security Policy endorses the spread of democracy and open market reform for
fledgling states in the region; this is a total reversal of the US policy of six years ago.
Since 1991, Russia and Ukraine have worked on a number of important bilateral
issues. The most significant is a Friendship Treaty resolving differences over borders and
trade relations. The signing of the Friendship Treaty has appeared imminent since 1993,
but was always delayed—most recently in October 1996. The primary stumbling blocks
preventing the conclusion of the Friendship Treaty were two: the division of the Black
Sea Fleet and the federal status of Sevastopol. However, these were merely
manifestations of a more fundamental problem: Russia did not accept the territorial
existence of Ukraine.
On 31 May 1997, after nearly six years of negotiations and the cancellation of five
scheduled trips, Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with his Ukrainian counterpart,
President Leonid Kuchma, in Kiev and signed the long-awaited Treaty on Friendship,
Cooperation and Partnership. NATO enlargement forced Russia to sign the treaty and to
recognize Ukraine as an independent state. This treaty, beyond affirming the inviolability
of present borders, marks the first step toward genuine development of cooperation and
security between the two independent states. Ukraine withstood the political and
economic pressures from Russia in order to maintain its sovereignty and independence. It
successfully shed the cloak "of a shared history between ruler and ruled."2
The Friendship Treaty and Black Sea Fleet negotiations continued almost without
interruption. From late 1996, negotiations for a solution became more intense. The
Russian fear of pushing Ukraine into NATO's orbit, if not its enlarging web of
membership directly influenced the search for solutions. Russia's refusal to sign a treaty
2 Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Balance of Power in the Black Sea in the Post-Cold War Era: Russia, Turkey,
and Ukraine," in Maria Drohobycky, ed., Crimea: Dynamics, Challenges, and Prospects (Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995), 161-2.
XI
and threats from Russian politicians committed the Ukrainian elites and pushed them to
the West. Russia belatedly realized that its policies were counter-productive. Ukraine
played the "NATO Trump Card." It continued leaning toward the West by pursuing a
special partnership agreement with NATO after refusing to join a Russian-led security
compact of former Soviet republics. In the end, Ukraine achieved recognition of its
borders.
Yeltsin's change in foreign policy objectives helped conclude these agreements.
He concluded a peace settlement with Chechnya in order to liquidate the war that was
sapping Russia's power and prestige. In Minsk, he established a relationship which Russia
sees as leading to a union. In Paris, he secured the Russia-NATO Founding Act because
Russia had no choice but to agree to what was going to happen anyway and bargain for
the best conditions possible. Finally, Yeltsin decided he had to work with Kiev, for it is
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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, world attention has
focused on the future of the new independent states (NIS) in Central and Eastern Europe.
Their survival has depended on Russia's recognition of existing and inviolable borders
between itself and the republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU). In 1991, Russia
declared itself successor to the Soviet Union and all its possessions within the Russian
Federation borders. With this action, Russia lost considerable territory and strategic
military assets. Its military position changed because of Ukraine. Specifically, the Soviet
Union possessed twenty-six harbors and naval bases in the Black Sea littoral. After the
dissolution of the empire, nineteen of these bases came under Ukrainian control, four
under Russian, and three under Georgian. 1 This division of assets significantly injured
Russian pride. The demise of the empire made it difficult for the country to accept the
territorial existence and independence of the former republics.
Geopolitically, Russia has strategic interests from the Sea of Japan to the Barents
Sea. Economically, it maintains ties with the NIS, but not to the same degree as during
the rule of the Soviet Union. Ethnically, it feels a strong need to ensure that the millions
of Russians living outside its borders receive fair treatment and do not create a massive
*Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Balance of Power in the Black Sea in the Post-Cold War Era: Russia, Turkey,
and Ukraine," in Maria Drohobycky, ed., Crimea: Dynamics, Challenges, and Prospects (Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995), 166.
UKRAINE
IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Figure 1-1
Reprinted from Sherman W. Garnett, The Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security
Environment of Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1997), 2.
migration back into Russia out of fear of discrimination. Russia could not handle the
economic ramifications of a large influx of refugees. 2
Ukraine has been of particular importance because, as an independent state, it
completely changes the face of Eastern Europe. It is a country of 52 million people with
an important geostrategic and geopolitical location. Ukraine's quest for independence
pushed Russian borders 500 miles to the east. Russia no longer shares common borders
with Hungary, Romania, or Slovakia. Ukraine limited Russia's access to the Black Sea.
Awareness of this gradually dawned on US policymakers. Since 1994, Kiev has received
noteworthy political and financial support from Western powers. Sherman Garnett best
describes why this country is important: "Ukraine is the keystone in the arch of the
emerging security environment in Central and Eastern Europe." 3
Russian national security interests in Ukraine include culture; language; the
strong Russian diaspora on the Crimean peninsula, as well as in eastern Ukraine; extensive
economic links: defense industry, agriculture, energy, and military early warning radar
systems; basing rights at Sevastopol; the Black Sea Fleet; and Ukraine's strategic and
crucial geographic location. The region is full of precious resources: Donetsk and
Kherson coal, Katerynoslav steel, Kharkiv industry, agriculture products (e.g. wheat, salt,
2John Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near Abroad."* Survival 36, no. 3,
(Autumn 1994), 71.
^Sherman W. Garnett, The Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of
Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997),
7.
Figure 1-2
Reprinted from Sherman W. Garnett, The Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security
Environment of Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1997), 12.
tobacco, wine and fruits), and the Crimean peninsula's vacationing resorts. 4 In
Sevastopol, Crimea, the Soviet Union built an impressive infrastructure to support the
Black Sea Fleet (BSF), to include training and research and development. "The monetary
value and strategic importance of this infrastructure far outweigh that of the actual ships
and aircraft of the BSF, since it includes a variety of facilities for testing new equipment,
as well as naval tactics and operations, and training naval personnel." 5 Additionally,
military shipbuilding facilities line the Crimean coast.
Ukraine has similar vital interests in Russia which directly impact on regional
stability. Ukraine depends on Russia for its energy. The industrial complexes require
equipment and parts from Russia. Many soldiers who declared Ukrainian citizenship and
service in the military are Russian. The country is home to a mix of ethnicities that has
made Ukraine's pursuit for independence difficult. The eastern region of Ukraine,
including Crimea, is home to heavy industry. Russians and Russian speakers largely
populate this area.
US engagement in Ukraine has made a significant difference. Even though the
presence and control of Ukraine's nuclear weapons were the causes for initial American
involvement, US leaders now realize Ukraine's significance for stability in the region. The
United States responded to the decline of communism with a "Russia first" policy
4Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near Abroad,'" 79
5John Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability McNair Paper 42, (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, August 1995), 48.
elaborated in 1992-93. Possibly out of legitimate concern for nuclear safety, the Bush
administration supported Russia and paid little attention to the fourteen other new states.
The idea was that Russian reforms would trickle down to other members of the CIS. This
policy essentially disregarded the new states' desires for independence without Russian
dominance. Many of the leaders in these states were suspicious of Russia's intent to rule
the region, in the same way it was dominated by the USSR.
In 1993, the United States began to change its policy. It took an active
involvement in the negotiations for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. US engagement
began with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START) and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Its consistent participation evolved into the US-Russian-
Ukrainian Trilateral Agreement in January 1 994, which provided Ukraine security
assurances in exchange for its dismantling and destruction of all nuclear weapons. In
1996, US policy again changed to support the development of "geopolitical pluralism" in
the region. 6 President Clinton's current National Security policy supports the spread of
democracy and open market reform for fledgling states in the region; this is a total reversal
from the US policy six years ago.
Since 1991, Russia and Ukraine have worked on a number of important bilateral
issues. These negotiations included nuclear disarmament, energy supply, debt negotiation,
evolution of the CIS, a deeper integration of the former Soviet republics, the fate of the
"Taras Kuzio, "NATO Enlargement: The View From the East," European Security (London: Frank
Cass, Newbury House, 6:1, Spring 1997), p. 50.
Crimean peninsula, and a Friendship Treaty resolving differences over borders and place
relations. Top officials in both countries stated numerous times that Russia and Ukraine
needed to develop normalized political and economic relations. However, on the other
hand, some Russian officials openly made territorial claims on the Eastern part of Ukraine.
Admiral Baltin, former Russian commander of the Black Sea Fleet, accurately describes
the opinion of Russian policy makers toward Ukraine:
Our people can't seem to grasp the fact that Ukraine ... is an autonomous
country with its own vision of foreign and domestic policy which differs
from Russia's. In naval language, the Russian ship is sailing east and the
Ukrainian ship is sailing west, toward NATO. And even though the world
is round, it doesn't mean we will meet at some point. 7
As a result, a comprehensive Friendship Treaty between Russia and Ukraine
remained unsigned for nearly six years. The signing of the Friendship Treaty has appeared
imminent since 1993, but was always delayed—most recently in October 1996. The
primary stumbling blocks preventing the conclusion of the Friendship Treaty were two:
the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the federal status of Sevastopol. However, these
were merely manifestations of a more fundamental problem: Russia did not accept the
territorial existence of Ukraine. Nonetheless, throughout the negotiations, Ukraine fully
realized that it would not survive without diplomatic and economic relations with Russia.
The Ukrainian President, Leonid Kuchma, made the following statement to journalists at
7Mikhail Levchenko, "Russia: Admiral Baltin Hits Leadership over [Black Sea] Fleet's Plight." Foreign
Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) Doc # FBIS-UMA-96-055-S, 20 March 1996, 6. Interview with
Admiral Eduard Baltin, former commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Moscow Pravda-5 , (15-22 Mar 96), 8-
9.
the end of 1996: "Ukraine and Russia need each other. Not only does Ukraine depend on
Russia—from a strategic point of view, Russia depends on Ukraine also. We suggest
having a normal relationship with Russia."8
A. THESIS
On 3 1 May 1997, in Kiev, after nearly six years of negotiations and the
cancellation of five scheduled trips, Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with his Ukrainian
counterpart, President Leonid Kuchma, in Kiev and signed the long-awaited Treaty on
Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership. NATO enlargement forced Russia to sign the
treaty and to recognize Ukraine as an independent state. This treaty, beyond affirming the
inviolability of present borders, marks the first step toward genuine development of
cooperation and security between the two independent states. 9 Ukraine withstood the
political and economic pressures from Russia in order to maintain its sovereignty and
independence. It successfully shed the cloak "of a shared history between ruler and
ruled." 10
The Friendship Treaty is very important to Ukraine for a number of reasons. First
and most important, the treaty guarantees Russian recognition of Ukraine as an
8
"Year in Review: Ukrainian-Russian Relations," The Ukrainian Weekly LXIV, no. 52, (29 December
1996), 4.
9 Svitlana Korynevych,"Ukraine: Fleet Seen as Obstacle to Treaty with Russia." Foreign Broadcast
Information Services (TBIS) Doc # FBIS-SOV-96-097, http://fbis.fedworld.gov, 8 May 1996, 1 (Kiev
Vseukrainskive Vedomosti 8 May 96).
10Sezer, "Balance of Power in the Black Sea in the Post-Cold War Era: Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine,"
161-2.
independent state with inviolable borders. Second, Ukraine is one of Russia's neighbors
and the treaty allows both of them the opportunity to restore normalized partnership
relations. Economically, they will enhance trade and production for mutual benefit. While
Ukraine acknowledges that Russia is its pre-eminent trading partner, both countries will
have a hard time existing without stable, mutually reciprocal, economic relations.
Politically, they will conduct bilateral negotiations as countries with equal status. Third,
with all of the Ukrainian borders recognized in treaties, international investors will feel
more secure in their Ukrainian investments. This will strengthen Ukraine's ailing
economy.
A number of significant events occurred in the course of the negotiating process
for the Friendship Treaty and the Black Sea Fleet Agreement. This thesis examines those
events by commencing with a short history of key events and developments immediately
before and after the fall of the Soviet Union. It then turns to a discussion of Russia's
"Near Abroad" foreign policy and the impact of the policy on Ukraine, the importance of
Sevastopol, and the Crimean separatist movements. It continues with a description of
President Yeltsin's change in foreign policy and the territorial claims the Russian
Parliament made on Sevastopol. A discussion of the Black Sea Fleet Agreement, the
Friendship Treaty and the impact ofNATO enlargement comprise the conclusion.
10
n. HISTORY
When the Soviet Union collapsed, two countries emerged that completely changed
Eastern Europe. Russia and Ukraine became independent actors quarreling over control
of the remnants of the imperial legacy. Under Communism, their relations were big
brother watching over little brother. This changed on 24 August 1991, when Ukraine's
declaration of independence seriously altered Russia's geopolitical situation on the
European continent. A host of reasons (to be discussed herein) has led to strained
relations that brought Ukraine's existing borders into question during the period 1991-
1997 and made a treaty essential if Russia and Ukraine were to have normal relations.
In the waning days of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR entered into two treaties with
the Russian Federation, both of which were conditional in nature. On 19 November 1990,
the Russian Federation and Ukraine signed the Treaty on the Basic Principles ofRelations
between the Russian Federation ofSoviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian SSR.
"The high contracting parties acknowledge and respect the territorial integrity of the
Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR inside the borders presently existing within theframework
of the USSR" (emphasis added). 11 When the republics of the former Soviet Union
declared their independence, this treaty held no significance. In December 1991, the CIS
agreement contained the following provision on the territorial integrity of member states:
1 Sherman W. Garnett, The Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging SecurityEmerging Security
Environment of Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1997), 58.
11
"The high contracting parties recognize and respect one another's territorial integrity and
the inviolability of existing borders within the commonwealth" (emphasis added). 12 This
made Russia's recognition of Ukraine's borders conditional upon Ukraine's full
membership in the CIS security institution. In 1991, this was the best guarantee of
independence that Ukraine could receive from Russia.
If a border between Russia and Ukraine was not unconditionally recognized and
inviolable, everything was open to discussion. Nothing was settled. Therefore,
negotiations for a new treaty were imperative and talks concerning a Russian-Ukrainian
Friendship Treaty began in 1992. On 23 June of that year, at Dagomys, representatives of
the two countries signed the Treaty Between Ukraine and the Russian Federationfor the
Further Development ofInternational Relations. As the title infers, this treaty committed
both nations to sign an agreement by which each party would recognize the other's
borders and establish good neighbor relations.
After that, the negotiations for the Friendship Treaty and the Black Sea Fleet
agreement passed through various stages of intensity. The initial period of negotiations
began in 1992 and continued until 1994. Negotiations came to a standstill as the United
States-Russian-Ukrainian tripartite agreement for nuclear disarmament took priority. The
Chechen War began in December 1 994 and Russia was not ready to continue the
negotiations seriously until 1995, when Presidents Kuchma and Yeltsin met in Sochi. The




After the collapse of the USSR, each new independent state declared exclusive
ownership over all former Soviet Union (FSU) facilities within its respective borders.
Russia made the first declaration and Ukraine followed suit shortly thereafter. Since the
Soviet Union had based the Black Sea Fleet in the city of Sevastopol, the fleet would seem
to have belonged to Ukraine, at least according to CIS agreements and international
norms. 13 However, President Boris Yeltsin could not politically afford to lose the Black
Sea Fleet to Ukraine. It was a Russian strategic arm. Therefore, he required that both
countries resolve the Black Sea Fleet division before he would sign the Friendship Treaty.
Many indicators showed that Russia would not recognize Ukraine's sovereignty.
First, immediately after Ukraine's declaration of independence, Yeltsin issued a statement
through his press office which stated the right of Russia to review the established borders
with the republics that wished to secede from the former Soviet Union. The presidential
spokesman stated that this referred to the largely Russian-populated areas near the
Russian borders—Crimea, Donbass and northern Kazakhstan. 14 Second, President Yeltsin
began to speak on behalf of the members of the CIS at international conferences,
especially at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Helsinki
13Yu Nepomnyashcha, "Ukraine: Security Commission Head Views Russia's Claims, Fleet Issue."
Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) Doc # FBIS-SOV-97-006. http://fbis.fedworld.gov, 26
December 1996, 1-2, (Interview with Volodymyr Mukhin, head of the Ukrainian Supreme Council
Commission for Security and Defense,Kiev Kwivska Pravda 26 Dec 96).
14Roman Solchanyk, "Crimea: Between Ukraine and Russia," in Maria Drohobycky, ed., Crimea:




Reprinted from Sherman W. Garnett, The Keystone in the Arch; Ukraine in the Emerging Security
Environment of Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1997), 14.
14
Review Conference in July 1992. 15 Third, after Ukraine's independence on 1 January
1992, Vladimir Lukin, then the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations and later Russian ambassador to the United
States, presented a draft resolution entitled "On the Decisions of the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet of February 19, 1954, and the USSR Supreme Soviet of April 26,
1954 Concerning the Removal of Crimea from the RSFSR." It called for the annulment of
the resolution placing Crimea under Ukraine's control. In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev, as
the Head of State, had transferred control of the Crimea to the Ukrainian Republic of the
USSR. It was a simple and logical administrative measure. Ukraine provided Crimea with
almost all of its water, electricity, industrial raw materials, etc. 16 Nothing resulted from
Lukin's 1992 resolution because the heated debate over the division of the Black Sea Fleet
prevented any action from being taken. 17 Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk were able to
defuse this potential crisis. These events appeared minor. However, they were small
indicators of Russia's future foreign policy on the "Near Abroad." This new policy
directly impacted Russian-Ukrainian relations and negotiations on the Friendship Treaty.
Russians perceived Ukraine as inseparable from the Federation During this early
period after the collapse of the USSR, Russians were convinced that Ukrainian
15Viacheslav Pikhovshek, "Will the Crimean Crisis Explode?" in Maria Drohobycky, ed., Crimea:
Dynamics, Challenges, and Prospects (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publ., Inc., 1995), 62.
16
"Domestic Pressures and Mutual Apprehensions Impair Russia-Ukraine Relations," Strategic
% Assessment 1995: Chapter Four-Defining Trends , http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa95/sach0401.
html#subhead2, 5.
17Maria Drohobycky, ed., Crimea: Dynamics, Challenges, and Prospects (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995), 7.
15
independence would not last. They thought of independence as a temporary phase. First,
Russian-Ukrainian relations date back to the time ofKievan-Rus when Kiev was the first
capital of Rus. Official Soviet theory states that "the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian
peoples stem from one root, which is the Old Rus' nationality that formed the Old Rus'
state—Kievan Rus.'" 18 According to the theory, the formation of the three East Slavic
peoples, took place in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, "when the Russian (or Great
Russian) nationality played the most important role of guarding the Kievan tradition, not
only during that formative period, but also in the two succeeding centuries." 19 In the
Russian mind, Kiev would always be part of Russia.
Second, Russian leaders thought that Ukraine would split into two or three regions
along ethnic lines. Ethnically, Eastern Ukraine is approximately 40 percent Russian and
Western Ukraine is about 10 percent Russian. Many expected Eastern Ukraine to petition
Russia for a union, while Western Ukraine continued its quest for independence. Eastern
Ukraine had always been considered South Russia. President Kravchuk often warned of
the danger with "two Ukraines." People were astonished that the nation remained unified
the first two years of independence. During a hearing of the US House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Representative Tom Lantos commented that "the Russian ambassador to
18Jaroslaw Pelenski, "The Contest for the 'Kievan Inheritance' in Russian-Ukrainian Relations: The
Origins and Early Ramifications," in Peter J. Potichnyj, et al., eds., Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical




Ukraine goes around and says that the current situation [i.e., Ukraine's independence] is a
temporary one."20
Third, Russia has always supplied Ukraine with energy, oil, and gas despite
Ukraine's erratic payments. The Chernobyl disaster ensured that this relationship would
continue. Nuclear energy provided approximately 40 percent of Ukraine's electricity.
Ukraine has a Russian gas pipeline that passes through the country and oil refineries at
Kremenchug, Lisichansk, and other sites over which Ukraine has no controlling interests.
Private Russian energy companies are building an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to the
Black Sea. Control and movement of this oil is very important to Russia.
Fourth, both Russian and Ukrainian armies collapsed with the USSR. Russia
stationed some of its best units and equipment in Ukraine. Before an independent Russia
or Ukraine, Moscow used the Soviet Military District in Kiev as a redeployment location
for Category I21 equipment returning from Central Europe. After the breakup, Ukraine
had over a million soldiers and an equivalent quantity of combat equipment (e.g., tanks,
artillery, aircraft, and helicopters) as Russia. 22 Ukraine survived and continued to build an
independent nation. Meanwhile, Russia defined a new foreign policy that impacted the
countries along its periphery.
20Randall G. Williams, "An Alternative Foreign Policy for Ukraine," Thesis (Naval Postgraduate School,
June 1993), 6.
2
'Category I equipment is the highest quality of equipment in the Soviet Union's inventory. During the
Cold War, the majority of this equipment was deployed in the Warsaw Pact's western region.
22Ibid., 14.
17
A. THE RUSSIAN "NEAR ABROAD'' FOREIGN POLICY
In 1992, Russia began searching for a security policy after the collapse of the
Soviet Union to define its role as protector of the region and as an international actor. 23
From 1992-1994, Russian foreign policy was extremely incoherent and understandably so
with the transition and constraints that the government was experiencing at the time.
Initially, the Yeltsin government had to develop two foreign policies: one for the "Near
Abroad" (its neighbors in the former Soviet Union), and the other for the "Far Abroad"
(the remainder of the world).
In late 1993, Russian foreign policy shifted from an initial status quo orientation,
focused on accepting the loss of control over the former Soviet republics, to a careful but
assertive policy. It was specifically directed at reestablishing Russia's preponderance over
the former republics of the Soviet Union and on maintaining the Russian military in as
many of the bordering countries as possible. "As Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Andrei
Kozyrev, took a much harder line toward Russia's 'Near Abroad,' Moscow seemed to
have reached a de facto consensus on restoring as much of the old Soviet empire as
possible under the banner of the CIS."24 At a January 1994 Russian policy conference in
Moscow, "Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev indicated his strong support for maintaining a
«
23John Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near Abroad,'" Survival 36, no. 3,
(Autumn 1994), 70.
24William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia, and the
Transcaucasus (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hudson Institute, 1995), 98.
Russian presence in 'regions which have been in the sphere of Russian interests for
centuries' and avoiding the emergence of a 'security vacuum' in the near abroad."25
Communists and nationalist patriots, such as former Vice President Alexander
Rutskoi, led the way toward this new foreign policy orientation. Rutskoi argued that no
serious military threats against Russia existed at the time. However, he insisted that
military affairs are dynamic and bordering states could acquire quality military forces,
conventional weapons, and weapons of mass destruction, specifically nuclear weapons.
"For Russia specifically... the large 'possible threat' would be the movement of military
forces into states on the CIS border. Other and more immediate threats were civil wars
within the CIS, including Russia."26
First, Rutskoi proposed a thinly veiled formula for reclaiming the old Soviet
borders by establishing a Russian "great power" status on the West, South, and East.
Second, he encouraged cautious cooperation with the West and Japan. He considered the
inclusion in NATO of the former Warsaw Pact states and Baltic republics as wholly
unacceptable. Third, cooperation with the United States in the Middle East and
Southwest Asia was secondary to maintaining Russia's influence in these two regions. 27
This foreign policy aimed at regaining lost power and prestige, but it required
political and military capabilities which Russia did not possess. It was clearly an example
25Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near Abroad,'" 74.




of imperial overstretch which threatened to unhinge Russia's fragile state and society.
Rutskoi's arguments were "effectively a summary of the strategic thinking within the
defense ministry in 1992, thinking that persisted there among conservative political circles
in 1993 and 1994 and that may have been the basis for policies implemented in 1993-
94 "28 Even though Rutskoi lost all his power by mid- 1993, President Yeltsin began to
adopt much of his "Near Abroad" policy. This is definitely evident with the well-
established Russian military in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, as well as the
Chechen war beginning November 1994.
The "Near Abroad" foreign policy had four planks. First, Russia wanted to
establish an economic union under the guise of the CIS, with Russian control and
influence. Economic integration can be a preface to later political and military
integration. 29 Second, analysts have termed Russia's intervention into the NIS as the
"Monroesky Doctrine," or officially known as the "Kozyrev/Karaganov doctrine."
Intervention became a means to incite separatism in the former republics. Separatists
naturally allied themselves with Russia and were positive influential forces in the
introduction of Russian peacekeeping forces or dual citizenship requirements. Third, this
foreign policy provided support for the large population of Russians outside the borders of
the federation. This protection for the Russian diaspora was "inconsistent with
international law and [had] potentially devastating security ramifications, as reflected in
28lbid.
29Taras Kuzio, "The Crimea and European Security," European Security 3, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 757.
20
former Yugoslavia. This plank of Russian policy [refused] to recognize its neighbors in
the 'Near Abroad' as fully fledged states, but only as satellites where Moscow [could]
exert pressure and dictate its will."30 In June 1993 at an Armed Forces Conference,
President Yeltsin proposed the fourth plank of forward positioning military forces
throughout the republics of the former Soviet Union. Two months later, he issued a
presidential decree to establish 30 bases in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Foreign
Minister Kozyrev supported this decree and stated "that Sevastopol had always been a
'Russian base'—and will always remain so."31 The establishment of military bases in the
"Near Abroad" would ensure a buffer zone or sphere of influence for Russia's perceived
national security. This foreign policy dictated many of the Russian leaders' decisions and
Russian Parliament's resolutions.
B. CRIMEAN SEPARATISM
The "Near Abroad" foreign policy indirectly incited separatist movements in
Crimea during the negotiations of the Friendship Treaty. The Crimean population
interpreted Russia's promise to protect its citizens outside the federation's borders as a
chance to join the Russian Federation. "As the Crimean crisis escalated, support for




Ibid., 759. For additional info., see Interfax, 10 June 1993, when Yeltsin pointed to Armenia, Georgia
and Moldova as states for forward Russian forces; ITAR-TASS news agency, 18 and 19 Jan 1994, and 28
Feb. 1994; and Rossiyskiye Vesti, 7 April 1994 and Rossiskaya Gazeta (Moscow), 29 April 1994.
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making finding a resolution to the Black Sea Fleet more difficult."32 Konstantin Zatulin,
Chairman of the Russian Duma's CIS committee and staunch supporter of military means
to implement foreign policy, described Crimea as being within Russia's "sphere of special
interests."33
Coinciding with widespread nostalgia for Crimea among the general public
is a growing trend in official circles, reflected in the evolution of Russia's
military and foreign policies following the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, to regard this country's neighbors within the CIS as falling into an
unquestioned sphere of direct Russian interest in which one will see an ever
increasing tendency toward economic, military, and political integration.
As part of this trend, Russia's leaders have demonstrated a strong
commitment, widely held among Russia's political parties, to maintain
military bases in CIS member states and promote member states' military
integration. 34
Crimea is the only eastern province in Ukraine with an ethnic Russian majority
—
67 percent of the Crimean population. Simferopol struggled with Kiev to declare its
autonomy for several reasons. After its transfer to the Ukrainian USSR in 1954, Crimea
remained tied to Moscow. The peninsula remained the center of military production,
naval bases, and resorts. Local officials were virtually unconnected with the Ukrainian
SSR government. Currently, it is the only region in Ukraine that still houses nearly 40,000




34John Jaworsky, "Crimea's Importance to Ukraine and its Future Security," in Maria Drohobycky, ed.
Crimea: Dynamics. Challenges, and Prospects (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publ., Inc.,
1995), 137.
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military retirees have also settled in the area and maintained active involvement in
politics. 35
After becoming the Ukrainian President in 1992, Leonid Kravchuk struck deals
with local elites in Crimea. He promised that he would leave them in power if they would
remain neutral in Ukraine's drive for independence from Russia and the CIS. As reform
became stagnant, this policy began to work against him. First, there was very little
forward momentum in democratic reform. Second, economic reform could not flourish
because the Soviet elites that he promised to leave in office did not support it. 36 Ukraine's
independence seemed weak in 1992 and many believed that it would not last. In 1993, the
civil war between Parliament and the President in Russia allowed Ukraine the freedom to
consolidate its position and its elites. In 1994, Russia's disastrous adventure in Chechnya
strengthened Ukraine's hand. Russian power and prestige were weakened. Russia could
hardly support separatists in Crimea while fighting in Chechnya.
In the 1994 Ukrainian presidential elections, Russia supported Leonid Kuchma.
Naturally, Crimea did the same. When Kuchma won, tensions relaxed. The new president
led a campaign which "effectively [discredited] Crimean separatism and [forced] its
legislature to eliminate the Crimean presidency and to bring its constitution into line with
Ukraine's own fundamental laws."37 Through a series of decrees, Kuchma subordinated
35 Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, 27.
36Kuzio, "The Crimea and European Security," 738.
37Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, 27.
23
the Crimean government to the Ukrainian cabinet of ministers and he reserved the right to
appoint the Prime Minister. Russia did not react because the executive branch considered
this an internal Ukrainian problem, like Chechnya was for Russia. However, President
Yeltsin did state that he would not sign the Friendship Treaty until he was confident that
Ukraine was respecting the rights of the Russians in Crimea.
The Crimean question has been resolved. The peninsula has its own Supreme
Council and Prime Minister as the chief executive. In March 1995, the Ukrainian
Verkhovna Rada abolished a whole series of Crimean laws, including the Crimean
Constitution. The Rada passed the resolution, which stated that the Crimean laws had to
be aligned with the Ukrainian Constitution. Crimea fully supports the seat of the
Ukrainian government in Kiev. Russia's decision not to intervene in Crimea, its
preoccupations with Chechnya, Ukraine's ability to avoid violence and find diplomatic
solutions, and Kuchma's election all contributed toward keeping the Crimean crisis
manageable.
C. THE ISSUE OF SEVASTOPOL
In addition to the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the basing rights at Sevastopol,
Crimea became a stumbling block in the negotiations of the Friendship Treaty. Even
today, many Russians still regard Sevastopol as "a city of Russian glory."38 They cannot
38Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov bluntly stated in a December 1996 interview with Russian NTV
company that "Sevastopol is a Russian city. Sevastopol, irrespective of any reasons [dictated by] the
current political situation, will belong to Russia." At the OSCE summit in Lisbon, Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin echoed, "Sevastopol is a Russian city; all the earth there is covered with the bones of
Russian sailors." See Den \ no. 33, 10 December 1996.
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accept Sevastopol being suddenly and inexplicably located in another country. Catherine
the Great built Sevastopol in 1783 to serve as the strategic Russian port for her Black Sea
Fleet. The British, Turks, and French bombarded the city during the Crimean War of
1853-1856. In World War II Sevastopol fell into German hands after 250 days of
pounding. Political officials and military leaders continuously emphasize the bravery of
the soldiers and citizens who died in the defense of Sevastopol. Residents of Sevastopol
are described as Russian and not former Soviets or Ukrainians in the text of Russian
speeches.
Rear Admiral Aleksandr Grinko, chief of the Black Sea Fleet directorate, made the
following observations about the importance of Sevastopol from a strategic viewpoint:
The entire Black Sea has no more convenient, deep, closed and vast bays
than the Sevastopol bays. Their advantages are obvious from all
standpoints: geopolitical, geostrategic, operational and tactical. In years
of the Soviet Union's existence a dock frontage extending over 10 km was
built in Sevastopol; a developed system of basing, command and control,
defense, operational and combat support and ship repair was created; and
the organization of deployment of forces from the base had been worked
out. As a main base, Sevastopol was framed by a system of defense and
protection against strikes from the air, from under water, from sea and
from land. A system for [target] identification and for issue of target
designation and a stable, reliable system of navigation, hydrometeorological
and logistic support were developed. Because of this, Black Sea Fleet
forces are capable of controlling all main axes of deployment and action of
probable enemy forces, and above all, exits from the Bosporus Strait and
the western and central parts of the Black Sea, thereby providing
protection for Russia's southern borders. 39
39Aleksandr Grinko, "Ukraine/Russia: Russia's Radm. Grinko Opposes Sevastopol Fleet Basing
Division," Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) Doc # FBIS-UMA-96-177-S, http://fbis.
fedworld.gov, 14 August 1996, (Sevastopol Flag Rodiny 14 Aug 96).
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On 9 July 1993, the Russian-Ukrainian crisis over Sevastopol erupted in the
Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federative Republic. The members overwhelmingly
approved a resolution "On the Status of the City of Sevastopol," which stated that
Sevastopol had federal status within Russia. 40 This act gained international attention and
condemnation. On 20 July 1993, the UN Security Council condemned this decision as a
violation of "universally recognized principles and norms of international law, in particular
Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, as well as resolutions of the OSCE
(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)."41 In an official statement with
Russia abstaining, the Security Council supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine and
recognized the Treaty signed on 1 9 November 1 990 at Kiev, in which both parties
committed themselves to maintain and respect current frontiers and borders.
The Security Council reaffirms in this connection its commitment to the
territorial integrity of Ukraine, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations. The Security Council recalls that in the Treaty between
the Russian Federation and Ukraine, signed at Kiev on November 19,
1 990, the high contracting parties committed themselves to respect each
other's territorial integrity within their currently existing frontiers. The
decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation is incompatible
with this commitment as well as with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, and without effect 42
40Yuri M. Shcherbak, Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States. Reprinted, "For the Record:






During the time of these resolutions, US-Ukrainian relations began to change
dramatically and assume a level of strategic importance that would eventually force Russia
to sign the Friendship Treaty. The US played an integral part in support of Ukraine's
drive for independence.
D. US-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS
In 1991-1993, United States policy toward Ukraine reflected a "Russia only" or a
"Russia first'
1
mind-set. During perestroika and the decline of communism, American
policymakers dealt exclusively with Moscow and did not recognize the other republics.
For example, President Bush cautioned Ukrainians to refrain from "suicidal nationalism"
during his visit to Kiev on 1 August 1991 . This was just three weeks before Ukraine's
declaration of independence.43
Despite Bush's comment, American policy began a slow and gradual shift in
recognition of Ukraine. Several days before the 1 December 1991 referendum for
Ukrainian independence, President Bush announced that the United States would
recognize Ukraine "in a relatively short period of time." 44 Recognition came on 25
December. The US opened formal diplomatic relations on 23 January 1992. In March
1 992, President Bush appointed as ambassador to Kiev his Ukrainian-American deputy
43AJexander J. Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism (New York: Council




press secretary, Roman Popadiuk. 45 This symbolized that the president was serious
enough about Ukraine to choose a member of his own staff for the post.
In May 1992, President Leonid Kravchuk visited Washington, DC. From these
negotiations, Ukraine received most favored nation status and the US extended Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance coverage to American firms doing
business in Ukraine. Additionally, the White House promised $10 million for the
establishment of an International Science and Technology Center in Kiev for Ukraine's
unemployed nuclear scientists 46
During 1992-1993, the question of nuclear weapons monopolized US policy
toward Ukraine. In January 1993, under the Lisbon Protocol, President Kravchuk
promised that Ukraine would ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) and
would accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon
state. Kiev failed to ratify these treaties even though President Kravchuk continuously
promised that the Rada would do it. Members of the Ukrainian Parliament consistently
complained that the United States was ignoring Ukraine's size and strategic importance.
In April 1993, several members of the Ukrainian Rada wrote a letter that supported
Ukraine's right to maintain nuclear weapons as a successor to the USSR. Ratification did




of Russian domination.47 Ukraine was very concerned with minimal security assurances if
it relinquished control of its nuclear weapons.
In early 1993, the United States needed to make a firm policy decision on Ukraine:
"either develop a stronger, more broadly based relationship with Ukraine, at the risk of
harming relations with Russia, or rebuff Ukrainian complaints and leave it to move toward
becoming a full-fledged nuclear power with all the attendant negative consequences."48
The latter was unacceptable to policymakers in Washington, DC. American stock in
Russian stability domestically and regionally fell. It was clear that democracy in Russia
was not imminent.
After the March 1993 US-Russian Vancouver summit, Strobe Talbott, then
ambassador-at-large to the CIS, and Les Aspin, former US Secretary of Defense, traveled
to Kiev. These visits signaled a change in US foreign policy as the Clinton administration
offered a helping hand to Ukraine. Talbott discussed US-Ukrainian bilateral relations,
support for economic reform, and military cooperation. He offered US services as an
intermediary to resolve disputes between Ukraine and Russia. Aspin stressed in his
comments that Ukraine's independence was in the "US interest."49 Zbigniew Brzezinski
and Henry Kissinger publicly pushed for a policy of "geopolitical pluralism" in the Clinton
administration that would build up the fledgling states.
47Taras Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy , The Washington Papers/167 (Washington, DC: The Center





In January 1994, the US helped Ukraine and Russia move one step closer toward
signing the Friendship Treaty. The US led the negotiations for signing the US-Russian-
Ukrainian Trilateral Agreement. This agreement resolved the outstanding differences on
nuclear disarmament from the START I and the NPT by promising Ukraine millions of
dollars in technical and financial assistance for dismantling the weapons. The Agreement
promised security assurances and reaffirmed the commitment ofNPT depository states
(United States, United Kingdom, and Russia) "to Ukraine, in accordance with the
principles of the Helsinki Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and
existing borders of Ukraine." 50 For the first time, this Agreement removed any conditional
recognition of Ukraine's borders from either Russia or other outside powers. Ukraine had
a stronger position from which to continue negotiations and move the Friendship Treaty in
the direction of unconditional recognition. The Agreement gave Ukraine the guarantees
that it could address future issues with support from the United States. It was a trilateral
framework among the three countries involved.
After this agreement, on 8 February 1994, Ukraine became the first post-Soviet
state to subscribe to Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework documents. This identified
Ukraine as a state that was very serious about independence and Western integration. In
March 1994, President Kravchuk visited the United States and cemented the new US-
Ukrainian relationship. As a result of the visit, the US doubled its aid to Ukraine to $700
million. Halfwas designated for economic aid which was conditional upon
50Garnett, Keystone in the Arch . 60.
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implementation of concrete economic reforms. The remainder was for nuclear
disarmament. International financial institutions developed a plan to support Ukrainian
economic reforms with credits of $3.5 billion over two years. This was followed by a
partnership and cooperation agreement with the EU that covered "political dialogue,
improved trade, and investment opportunities"51
In early 1994, US-Ukrainian relations improved because the Ukrainian parliament
ratified the START I treaty without changes, Ukraine had security assurances from the
Trilateral Agreement, and US policymakers and media debated the strategic significance of
an independent Ukraine. 52 In late 1994 after the Ukrainian presidential elections, US-
Ukrainian relations dramatically improved under President Kuchma. The new president
introduced a radical economic and political reform package which the parliament backed.
International financial institutions agreed to provide monetary aid. In October-November
1994, Kuchma visited the United States and Canada and received additional pledges of
financial aid and political support from the G-7. 53
Currently, the United States and Ukraine are in a strategic partnership. As Yurii
Shcherbak Ukrainian Ambassador to the US stated, this was "the primary achievement of
independent Ukraine's foreign policy." 54 As a result, in 1996, the US and Ukraine
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established the Kuchma-Gore interstate commission. It consists of four committees for
international affairs, defense, regular economic cooperation, and trade and capital
investments. The importance of this commission is the United States' s recognition of
Ukraine's key role in European security.
Ukraine has received a large amount ofUS and US backed tangible assistance. US
aid which Ukraine receives is the third largest in the world. Israel receives $3 billion,
Egypt — $2 billion, and Ukraine— $225 million. Ukraine has received $2.5 billion from
US backed financial organizations. The IMF has issued several inexpensive credits to
Ukraine. The World Bank has a total of $3 billion in various projects with Ukraine. 55
At the G-7 meeting on 2 1 -22 June 1 997 in Denver, Colorado, the problem at
Chernobyl received high visibility from the other leading industrialized countries.
Approximately $1.5 billion in projects have been approved and are currently underway.
This is evidence that "not only the Americans, but the entire world community is beginning
to look at Chernobyl not only from the standpoint of energy generation, but above all from
the standpoint of nuclear security." 56
The United State's commitment to Ukraine will continue for a long time
—
politically, economically, and militarily. In August 1997, Ukrainian, US and other PfP
United States Yuriy Shcherbak, (Washington, D.C.) "Yuriy Shcherbak: 'The Road to Strategic
Partnership With the United States Was Uneasy."'
55Ibid.
56
"Security Chief Reiterates Ukraine's Right to drop Neutral Status, Build Nuclear Missiles," BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts Lexis-Nexis, June 20, 1997, (Interfax news agency. Moscow, in English
1804 gmt 18 Jun 97).
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member countries conducted a military exercise in Ukraine. "Operation Sea Breeze"
involved naval and ground forces with operations in Crimea. In 1997, the US will provide
Ukraine $330 million in grants and about $350 million in bilateral credits. Furthermore, in
October 1997, Ukraine and the United States will hold bilateral negotiations at the Air
Force Academy in Colorado. These negotiations signify a strong US commitment to
Ukraine's independence.
E. FRIENDSHIP TREATY NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE
During the time that Ukraine moved toward the West, negotiations on the
Friendship Treaty continued with the hope that both parties would quickly sign. On 9 July
1995, in Sochi, President Yeltsin and President Kuchma met to determine the main
principles for the division of the Black Sea Fleet and resolve the problems over the
Crimean crisis. Generally, they decided that they would split the forces in half and
Ukraine would sell about 80 percent of its equipment to Russia in exchange for debt relief.
This meeting demonstrated that the Parliament had no power in the foreign policy
decisions of Russia. Its ineffective resolutions turned into sideshows which the President
or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refuted in public. Russian public officials denounced
Ukrainian independence. President Yeltsin refused to support these statements.
Mainstream politicians were acting in their own self-interest.
The agreement between Yeltsin and Kuchma seemed to have solved all the issues
relating to a bilateral Friendship Treaty. During a visit to Crimea ten days later, President
Kuchma stated that he and Boris Yeltsin had ended disputes between the two countries
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over the status of Crimea during the Sochi summit. He stated that "Russia has reaffirmed
its respect for Ukraine's territorial integrity." 57 Nonetheless, almost two years would pass
before signing the Friendship Treaty.
Since 1992, the negotiations for the Friendship Treaty have been a forum for
resolving tensions over the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol basing rights, border recognition,
and separatist movements. The Treaty has been on the verge of completion several times
since then. This demonstrates that the leaders wanted to avoid conflict and lessen tensions
through promises of progress, but they refused to resolve the larger issues at the expense
of their political careers. 58
57Svitlana Korynevych, "Ukraine: Fleet Seen as Obstacle to Treaty with Russia." Foreign Broadcast
Information Services (FBIS) Doc # FBIS-SOV-96-097, http://fbis.fedworld.gov, 8 May 1996, 1, (Kiev
Vseukrainskiye Vedomosti 8 May 96).
58Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, 59.
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m. THE SECOND STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS
A. PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Russia's strict interpretation of its "Near Abroad" foreign policy began to change
in October 1996. Russian Security Council Secretary Ivan Rybkin stated in October and
November 1 996 that in association with President Yeltsin, he started planning for the
signing of several treaties and agreements. Rybkin met with President Yeltsin to develop a
logical connection for the upcoming agreements. First, they identified the principles of
national security. The leadership decided that the main threats to Russia remain internal
and nonmilitary in nature. As Rybkin stated, "The wish still to take on the whole world is
an atavistic symptom, a recurrence of what we have been through before." 59 The focus on
an internal threat of drugs, organized crime, weapons of mass destruction, and other
problems presupposes a redistribution of resources to solve social, economic, political,
and other questions. 60 Obviously, Russia needed to make peace with its neighbors to have
time to heal its internal wounds.
Second, Russia needed to resolve the Chechen crisis. Chechnya changed
everything because it made Russia seem powerless. It made it impossible to support
separatism abroad while fighting a domestic war. Additionally, the world needed to see
59
"Russian Security Council Head Says Recent Agreements Have Strengthened Security," BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts Lexus- Nexus, June 12, 1997. Vladimir Yanchenkov/'Ivan Rybkin: We Cannot
and We Will Not Take On the Whole World," Trud, (10 Jun 97).
60Ibid.
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that Moscow could diplomatically handle internal problems before it would honor Russia's
status as a serious international actor.
Third, Yeltsin redefined his foreign policy. The hard-line stance was pushing
Ukraine closer to NATO. NATO members prepared to invite new countries for
membership at the July 1997 Madrid Summit. The promise ofNATO enlargement, with
US support, now pushed Russia toward the Ukraine treaty. Yeltsin's new vision for
Russia was not widely known among leading politicians. As the negotiations for the
Friendship treaty and the Black Sea Fleet Agreement intensified, mainstream politicians
supported a strict interpretation of the original "Near Abroad" foreign policy. Russian
statesmen accused Ukraine of defying Russia and not acting out of genuine interests and
Ukrainians accused Russians of not accepting Ukrainian independence.
B. THE SEVASTOPOL CAMPAIGN
During the first half of 1996, the actual division of the Black Sea Fleet had already
started, based on Yeltsin's and Kuchma's agreement at Sochi in July 1995. Although the
details for the agreement were incomplete, the navies had established separate command
structures and began splitting ships and equipment. However, in October, this division
came to an abrupt halt. Actions by the Russian Parliament and Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada
soured relations between the two countries and reignited deeply felt feelings of mistrust.
In the latter half of 1996, both houses of the Russian Parliament and top officials made
territorial claims on Ukraine and stated that Sevastopol had never been and would never
be part of Ukraine. Russian officials proposed halting the Black Sea Fleet's division.
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Gen. Aleksandr Lebed, then chief of the Russian Security Council, and Moscow Mayor
Yurii Luzhkov, as well as others, were responsible for initiating this campaign with their
emotional calls to claim Sevastopol a "Russian" city. 61 The Russian Duma and Federation
Council passed a number of resolutions which obviously went against Yeltsin's foreign
policy agenda as well as internationally accepted standards for the recognition of
Ukraine's borders.
On 16 October 1996, the Russian State Duma, by a unanimous vote of 337:0,
adopted a draft bill "On Cessation of the Black Sea Fleet Division," in which Russia
unilaterally decided to halt the division of the Black Sea Fleet (including personnel and
equipment). Thus, Russia became totally responsible for finances of the entire fleet and
support facilities at Sevastopol. 62 However, at this time, Russia was not even paying its
military service members; therefore, the source of financial support for Sevastopol
operations was unclear. Former Ukrainian Supreme Council Chairman Ivan Plyushch was
convinced that this was "not only a violation of the agreements reached between Ukraine
and Russia, but also a clearly expressed aggression against a sovereign state."63
A few days later, on 22 October, both negotiating parties reached mutually
beneficial agreements which suggested that Russia and Ukraine would sign the Friendship
61Yuri M. Shcherbak, Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States. Reprinted, "For the Record:
Shcherbak on the Status of Sevastopol." The Ukrainian Weekly LXIV. no. 51 (22 December 1996), 2.
62Natalya Filipchuk, "Ukraine: Reaction to Duma Resolution on Black Sea Fleet Pondered." Foreign
Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) Doc # FBIS -SOV-96-206, 19 October 1996, 2, (Kiev Holos
Ukrayiny , 19 Oct 96, 4).
63Ibid.
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Treaty. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Serov, as the head of a task force visiting
Kiev, conducted "specific talks" for resolving the Black Sea Fleet problem. Following the
talks, Kuchma stated that "there is practical understanding; (there are) no differences. A
'clear agreement' has been reached that the Russian fleet will be stationed in Sevastopol
'on leasing terms.'"64 The Russian delegation even stated that it would pay Ukraine for
the time that the Black Sea Fleet had already been based in Sevastopol—a debt totaling
$40 million. 65
However, on 24 October 1 996, the Russian State Duma unanimously passed a
declaration, by a vote of 282:0, demanding that "the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet drop its
unilateral approach to such issues as dividing the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet, Crimea's
arbitrary transfer from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 and the status of Sevastopol."66
Representatives in the Duma argued that Sevastopol became part of Russia in the late
eighteenth century that it was the main base of the Black Sea Fleet and a special
administrative district, reporting directly to St. Petersburg. Furthermore, in 1948, the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the former Soviet Union decreed that Sevastopol was
"an independent and administrative center." Politicians pointed to this as a "still valid"
64Nikolay Zherebtsov, et.al., "Ukraine: Kuchma meets Mayors of Kiev, Sevastopol; BSF Discussed,"
Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) Doc # FBIS-SOV-96-208, http://fbis.fedworld.gov, 24
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decree. The October 1996 declaration, passed by the State Duma, reads, "Considering
this [the 1948 decree], all of Ukraine's unilateral acts proclaiming Sevastopol under
Ukrainian jurisdiction cannot be recognized as lawful, as agreed on with Russia and as
contradicting with the then valid Soviet Constitution" since Russia considers itself as the
successor of the former Soviet Union and its laws. 67
On the same day, President Kuchma flew to Moscow to visit with President
Yeltsin prior to Yeltsin's planned heart surgery. After the meeting, Yeltsin's press
secretary stated that the two presidents had reached verbal agreements "on all questions
associated with the Black Sea Fleet." The press secretary emphasized "that the
agreements reached, [would] remove the question on the status of Sevastopol, and on the
question of division of the Black Sea Fleet; they came to an 'absolutely compromise
solution.'"68 However, no one elaborated on the details of the agreement. As a
conclusion to the verbal agreement, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, in
President Yeltsin's place, planned to visit Kiev before mid-November to sign a package of
agreements for resolving the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol problems. 69
In response to the demands of the Russian State Duma on 24 October, the
Ukrainian Foreign Ministry accused the Russian parliament of interfering with Ukrainian
67Zherebtsov, "Ukraine: Kuchma meets Mayors of Kiev, Sevastopol; BSF Discussed," 3.
68Yekaterina Sytaya and Viktor Timoshenko. "Russia: Russian Paper on Black Sea Fleet Settlement
Efforts with Ukraine," Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) Doc # FBIS-UMA-96-235-S,




domestic affairs and making territorial claims within Ukraine. The Foreign Ministry
cautioned Russia that Ukraine would request international intervention to help solve the
Black Sea Fleet dispute if territorial claims continued. 70 In response, Viktor
Chernomyrdin canceled his 15 November visit to Kiev, thus ending all hopes of
concluding the treaty before the New Year. 71 Two weeks later, on 30 November 1996,
President Kuchma emphatically called for a halt to the division of the BSF. He wanted to
separate the two issues and complete the signing of the Friendship Treaty. 72
In November 1996, Ivan Bizhan, Ukraine's first deputy defense minister and a
participant in all talks with Russia on the Black Sea Fleet problem and Sevastopol's status
since 1992, presented six principles that Kiev adhered to throughout the fleet negotiations
with Moscow:
First, the Black Sea Fleet infrastructure [was] not subject to division,
because it is the property of Ukraine (some facilities of the infrastructure
could be leased to the Black Sea Fleet). Second, the Black Sea Fleet
[could] in principle be based in Sevastopol, but being a Ukrainian city, it
cannot be considered a Black Sea Fleet base. Third, Russia [will] clearly
determine the Black Sea Fleet's numerical and combat composition that it
intends to base on Ukrainian territory, and submit to Kiev all information
on the mechanics of changing these parameters. Fourth, the Russian part
of the ground component of the Black Sea fleet, after its division, will be
removed from Ukraine. Fifth, questions of the location of the Ukrainian
70Oleg Varfolomeyev, "Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet," Open Media Research Institute (OMRI)
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Navy staff and the disposition of Ukraine's Navy [were] not subject to
talks, because this is Ukraine's internal affair. Sixth, and finally, regardless
of where the Russian Black Sea Fleet is based—in the city or elsewhere
—
Ukraine's naval ships will in any event be based in the city. 73
Taras Kuzio, an expert on Russian-Ukrainian relations, argued that 1 996 saw a
dangerous convergence of support between the Russian legislative and executive
branches. These two branches aligned themselves with hard-line policies which were
opposed to Ukraine's position on the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol. On 3 December
1996, Moscow's Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's support,
sponsored a resolution in the Russian Federation Council. This resolution followed the
State Duma's previous mandates and called for Sevastopol to be a Russian city.
Chernomyrdin, "using nationalist language and rhetoric usually reserved for the extreme
wing of Russian politics,"74 appealed to Ukraine to recognize its claim to sovereignty over
Sevastopol as illegal. Two days later, on 5 December, the Federation Council, the upper
chamber of the Russian Parliament, by a vote of 1 10: 14, adopted this legislative package.
It also adopted, by a unanimous vote of 348:0, a resolution to preserve the Black Sea fleet
as an entity, halting any plans for division. In response to the Russian Federation
Council's actions, Yurii Sergeyev, Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson,
73Koretskiy and Zamyatin, "Russia: Fleet Talks Push Ties with Kiev Toward State of 'Cold War,'" 2.
74Kuzio, "Russian-Ukrainian Row Worsens," 2.
41
stated, "Ukraine's territorial integrity has been recognized by all nations, and none
—
except for certain political circles in Russia—calls it into question."75
On 6 December, in response to the Federation Council's actions, the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine approved a resolution with the following language:
By its recent actions the Russian side has aggravated the situation to the
utmost. In view of such unfriendly actions of the Russian Federations'
Federal Assembly, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine makes a resolute
protest against falsifications, specifically around the status of the city of
Sevastopol which is an alienable part of Ukraine, rejects any territorial
claims on Ukraine and views them as a deliberate undermining of European
security. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine declares that Sevastopol has
been and shall remain Ukrainian territory. No one in Ukraine shall ever
carry on any negotiations which would contradict the Constitution of
Ukraine, its legislation, its national interests, and which would lead to its
territorial disintegration. Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine introduces the draft bill on withdrawal of Russian troops
from the territory of Ukraine and appeals to international institutions on
grounds of infringement upon our sovereignty. 76
Ukraine's Supreme Rada prepared a draft law in reaction to the Russian
Parliament's insistence on Sevastopol as a Russian city. The draft law required the
withdrawal of all foreign troops from Ukrainian territory by the year 2000. 77 However, if
the resolution passed, it would have presented two difficult problems. First, what would
Kiev do if the year 2000 came and went and the Black Sea Fleet was still based in
75Roman Woronowycz, "Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada Takes Action against Russian claims to Sevastopol,'
The Ukrainian Weekly LXIV, no. 50, (15 December 1996), 17.
76Shcherbak, "For the Record: Shcherbak on the Status of Sevastopol." 11.
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Sevastopol? Currently, Ukraine does not have the military strength to challenge the Red
Army and forcibly evict the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Second, the repair plants in
Sevastopol employ 80,000-120,000 workers. If the fleet would have departed, Ukraine
would have become responsible for urgently finding jobs and paying wages to these
unavoidably unemployed people. Hennadii Udovenko, the Ukrainian foreign minister,
recently stated that a realistic withdrawal would require 25 years. "This estimate was
made by professionals who had examined the issue in detail."78
Russia's actions demonstrated to the world that it still saw Ukraine as a "little
Russia" or "little brother." In December 1996, Leonid Kuchma stated:
Not everyone in Russia has so far learned to perceive Ukraine as a
sovereign state. They still cannot get rid of the syndrome of aggressiveness
in relations with us and refrain from ordering Ukraine about. The issue of
dividing up the Black Sea Fleet and the status of Sevastopol have been
turned into a particularly knotty problem. One month ago [November
1996], we were actually ready to sign an agreement on the fleet.
Incidentally, we agreed to provide the most favorable conditions for the
functioning of the Russian part of the fleet, and this would automatically
have opened the way to signing a large-scale treaty. However, there are
politicians in Russia who are stubbornly playing the Crimean card, with
very far-reaching intentions in mind. 79
78Yu Nepomnyashcha, "Ukraine: Security Commission Head Views Russia's Claims, Fleet Issue,"
Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) Doc # FBIS-SOV-97-006. http://ibis.fedworld.gov, 26
December 1996, 2-3, (Interview with Volodymyr Mukhin, head of the Ukrainian Supreme Council
Commission for Security and Defense, Kiev, Kwivska Pravda 26 Dec 96).
79Leonid Kuchma, "For the Record: Kuchma Speaks on the CIS and Black Sea Fleet Issue." Reprinted
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Some members of the Russian State Duma did recognize Ukraine as an
independent sovereign state. On 17 December 1996, a group of Russian Duma deputies
arrived in Kiev for a two-day meeting in an attempt to calm strained Ukrainian-Russian
relations in light of the most recent resolution passed by the Russian Federation Council.
Svetlana Goryacheva, vice-chairperson of the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament,
led the delegation and made the following press conference statement at the end of the
roundtable dialogue: "Russia has no claims on Ukrainian territory. This is, at least, the
opinion of the State Duma. We can squabble, but in the end, we must guide our peoples
to accord."80 On the same day, in Moscow, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesmen
Gennadiy Tarasov renounced the Federation Council's resolution claiming Sevastopol.
He officially stated, "Sevastopol and all of Crimea belong to Ukraine." 81
The New Year brought about additional problems. On 14 January 1997, the
Ukrainian newspaper Vseukrainskiye vedomosti printed an allegedly top-secret Russian
letter, which called for measures against Kuchma in order to get him impeached from
office. Supposedly, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergii Krylov wrote the letter to
Russian presidential foreign policy advisor Dmitrii Ryurikov on 30 October 1996. In the
letter, Krylov condemned Kuchma for rejecting CIS integration, splitting the Black Sea
Fleet and claiming Sevastopol as Ukrainian territory. 82 Russian officials angrily
80Marta Kolomayets, "Duma Members Arrive in Kyiv for Roundtable," The Ukrainian Weekly LXIV, no.
51, (22 December 1996), 1.
81 Ibid, 5.
82Ustina Markus, "Ukrainian Newspaper Publishes Controversial Letter from Russian Official," Open
Media Research Institute Daily Digest II (OMRI) No. 10 (15 January 1997), 1.
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denounced the letter as a "forgery."83 Ironically, Russia had supported Leonid Kuchma in
the 1 994 Ukrainian presidential elections as a Russified Eastern Ukrainian with ties to the
USSR defense industry. His pragmatic approach toward foreign policy appealed to
Russia's goals for deeper integration. They hoped he would favor reintegration of
Ukraine into Russian-led economic and military structures.
Another scandal started three days later. On 17 January 1997, the Moscow Mayor
flew to Sevastopol where he asserted that the city was Russian and that the former Soviet
leader Nikita Khrushchev had handed Crimea over to Ukraine "after a drinking binge." 84
Foreign Minister Udovenko had "personally appealed to [him] not to visit Sevastopol or
aggravate the situation there. . . ,"85 Surprisingly, the Russian executive branch never
openly criticized Luzhkov for his actions. The Russian presidential spokesman, Sergei
Yastrzhembskii, merely stated that Luzhkov's position and statements "should not be
confused with the position of the president of the country and Russia in general with
regard to Ukraine."86 Ukraine's Foreign Ministry called Luzhkov's statements
"'unfriendly' and his claim that Sevastopol 'is and will stay a Russian city' a threat to
83 Scott Parrish, "Russia Denounces Alleged Letter on Ukrainian Policy," Open Media Research Institute
Daily Digest II (OMRI) No. 10, (15 January 1997), 3.
84UsUna Markus, "Moscow Mayor in Sevastopol," Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest II
(OMRI) No. 13, (20 January 1997), 1.
85Ustina Markus, "Ukrainian Reactions to Luzhkov Visit," Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest
II (OMRI) No. 13, (20 January 1997), 2.
86 Scott Parrish, "Yeltsin Rejects Luzhkov's Stance on Sevastopol," Open Media Research Institute Daily
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Ukraine's territorial integrity." 87 Despite the emotional rhetoric and territorial claims on
Ukraine, the negotiating teams continued to work to meet Yeltsin's deadline for Russia's
diplomatic revolution.
C. A "SUPER-GOOD HARVEST" IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
In May 1997, a time that President Yeltsin termed as "a month of a super-good
harvest," Russia attempted to secure its position as a global power in the face of an
expanding West. Yeltsin's energetic activity abroad, where he concluded several treaties
and agreements, is evidence that he was largely responsible for the new direction of
Russia's foreign policy. It seems that despite the opposition of a significant part of
Russia's political elite, the president successfully redefined the "Near Abroad" foreign
policy and adapted it to the country's current capabilities and international position. The
Russian government concluded four important agreements which changed Eastern
European politics. The signed treaties acknowledge that Russia' s current borders are
fixed. Aggressive action toward Ukraine and the "Near Abroad" had proved
counterproductive. It caused domestic instability and weakened Russia's international
position. Russia decided that it had to change to assure itself a generation of peace in
order to rebuild. At this time, Russians began to say that Ukraine was their most
important foreign policy problem.
8701eg Varfolomeyev, "Ukraine Protests Moscow Mayor's Claim on Sevastopol," Open Media Research
Institute Daily Digest II (OMRI) No. 14, (21 January 1997), 1.
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Simultaneously, Ukraine concluded bilateral and multilateral agreements with
neighboring countries. President Kuchma called this the creation of "a belt of stability"
around Ukraine. 88 It is more than coincidental that the Ukrainian and Russian Presidents
concluded agreements with some of the same state actors during this period of foreign
policy success. Even though Ukraine had not applied for NATO membership, it required
consideration in order for the international community to recognize it as an important
actor in the region. Ukraine needed to conclude border agreements with all its neighbors
in order to achieve this.
The following actions illustrate the success of Russian and Ukrainian foreign
policy: 89
•On 7 May, NATO General Secretary Solana opened the NATO Information
Center in Kiev and officially presented President Kuchma the draft charter on the future
relationship between NATO and Ukraine.
•On 8 May, the presidents of Ukraine, Russia and Moldova approved an
agreement which peacefully settled disputes in the Trans-Dniester Republic.
•On 1 2 May, Yeltsin and Chechen President Asian Maskhadov signed a treaty
which codified peaceful and normalized relations between Moscow and the Republic of
Ichkeria (the official name for Chechnya). "Russia renounced the use or threat of force in
its relations with Chechnya, while Maskhadov assured Yeltsin that he would fight
terrorism in the state."90
88Leonid Kuchma, "President Kuchma defends treaty with Russia in radio address," BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts 9 June 1997, (Source: Radio Ukraine World Service, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1900 gmt 6
Jun 97).
89Yuriy Shcherbak. Interview at a National Press Club Meeting with Russian and Ukrainian
Ambassadors to the United States, "Russia-Ukraine, Opening a New Stage of Partnership in a Multipolar
World," Federal News Service Lexis-Nexis, 10 June 1997. Ambassador Shcherbak discusses all these
dates in his speech.
90
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•On 13 May, Belarussian President Lukashenka traveled to Kiev and signed a
border agreement with President Kuchma. The agreement delineated the borders between
Belarus and Ukraine.
•On 16 May, at the first full meeting of the Ukraine-US Bi-national Commission in
Washington, DC, President Kuchma, President Clinton and Vice President Gore reviewed
the strategic partnership between the Ukraine and the US, and discussed the deepening of
cooperation between the two states in various fields, in particular, the economic arena.
Kuchma presented the timeline for concluding the NATO charter to the US President and
Vice-President. Clinton agreed to push for an accelerated negotiation schedule which
would conclude the agreement at the Madrid Summit. 91 Also, President Clinton and Vice
President Gore assured President Kuchma that Washington was determined to fund a
project to stop the destroyed generating unit at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant from
being a source of danger.
•On 21 May, President Kuchma and Polish President Kwasniewski signed the
Declaration on Historic Reconciliation. This document outlined details on accord and
unity for the actions of both countries.
•On 23 May, President Yeltsin and Belarussian President Aleksandr Lukashenka
signed The Charter on the Union ofBelarus and Russia. The Union strengthens the
relations between the two states and promotes their mutual socio-economic development,
however, it does not address the incorporation of Belarus into Russia as a single state.
•On 27 May, President Yeltsin and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana signed
The NATO Founding Act in Paris. This accord states that NATO and Russia no longer
see each other as adversaries. It establishes a new Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council
in Brussels which gives the Russian position a voice and consideration in NATO, but not a
vote. In the accord, NATO assures Russia that it will station neither nuclear weapons nor
permanent combat forces on the territories of new members. In return, Yeltsin announced
that all nuclear weapons aimed at NATO states would be detargeted. Security Council
Secretary Rybkin stated that this agreement eliminates the us-versus-them attitude.
"There will be European and world security without dividing lines, and Russia will be an
equal among equals. If you scrutinize the document closely, you will see that Russia's
concerns are in large measure taken into account"92
9
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Russia's world has now become organized on economic, military-strategic and
geopolitical realities. Many more players have a part in foreign policy decisions in Russia
than just the president and his government: financial and banking interests, the oil and gas
sector, and regional elites. These economic forces and Western expansion are following in
the wake ofNATO enlargement. By signing the NATO Founding Act, Russia
acknowledged this uncompromising reality. Central and Eastern Europe have gravitated
toward Western Europe through NATO, PfP, and economic initiatives supported by
western powers. The rules, codified in the Founding Act, govern Russia' s partnership
with the North Atlantic Alliance and assign it a role that is worthy of a great power. 93
Whether Russia can maintain that role depends on its internal stability as a country.
Following the NATO Founding Act from 26-27 May 1997, the presidents of
Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia met in Tallinn and signed a joint
communique in the areas of cooperation and security. The communique "places special
emphasis on the consolidation of efforts to create a stable, secure, integrated, and
indivisible Europe where no country would be threatened by another. The presidents
underscored that every state has the right to choose means and instruments to ensure its
security, especially by treaties or alliances"—this being one of the key principles of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 94
93
"Fleet Accord Paves Way to Russia-Ukraine Treaty," Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press XLIX,
no. 22, (July 2, 1997), 5. Stanislav Kondrashov, "Ten Days that settled the World," Izvestia , (June 3,
1997), 2.
94Yuri M. Shcherbak, "The Geopolitical Situation of Ukraine at Present and in the Future," Analysis of
Current Events 9, no. 8, (August 1997), 6.
49
D. THE BLACK SEA FLEET AGREEMENT
On 28 May 1997, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and his Ukrainian
counterpart, Pavlo Lazarenko, signed the Black Sea Fleet agreements which resolved the
division of the fleet, its basing rights in Sevastopol, Ukraine's debt relief and Russian lease
payments for the required ports to support the fleet. In addition, they also signed eleven
interstate, intergovernmental, and interagency agreements and protocols with Ukraine.
As in all bilateral negotiations, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and
Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko made compromises to reach a final agreement
on the Black Sea Fleet and basing rights in Sevastopol. The tradeoff was that Russia had
to minimize its demands for debt repayment and Ukraine had to minimize its claims to
Sevastopol. Ukraine had to make legal concessions against its Constitution in reference to
the stationing of foreign forces on its territory. In an interview of Ukrainian First Deputy
Defense Minister Ivan Bizhan, the interviewer brought up the clause in the Ukrainian
constitution which states that "Ukraine, in carrying out its foreign and military policies in
accordance with its national interests, is against the location of foreign troops on its
territory." Minister Bizhan responded that the transitional provisions of the constitution
helped to untie the knot of the Black Sea Fleet problems. 95 Since the agreement is based
on leasing for a specified time frame, it does not technically violate the Constitution even
though the spirit may have been sacrificed.
95
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The division of the Black Sea Fleet began in 1995 when President Yeltsin and
President Kuchma met in Sochi to determine percentages for the split. At that time, the
two presidents decided that Ukraine and Russia would split the naval force in half. The
force consisted of 525 combatant, auxiliary and support ships. However, Russia agreed to
buy back 117 vessels of Ukraine's 262 vessel share in exchange for debt relief. Ukraine
would actually control 18.3 percent of the fleet while Russia reestablished control of the
other 81.7 percent. Bilateral negotiations continued for the next two years following this
agreement.
The Black Sea Fleet agreement provides Russia the infrastructure and support to
sustain operations in the time of conflict. In accordance with the agreement and
appendices, Russia will gain control over all of Sevastopol's four principal bays, three of
which the Black Sea Fleet will maintain sole use over the next 20 years. Admiral Victor
Kravchenko, Commander of the Ukrainian Navy, explained that negotiators determined
the 20-year time limit based on the sum of Ukraine's debt to Russia divided by the annual
amount of the lease. Without this agreement, Kiev would have been unable to repay the
debt within the next 100 years. 96
The agreement provides that Russia will lease all the piers in the Kazachya and
Karantinnaya Bays. In the Sevastopolskaya Bay, Russia will control primary docking
space for over 30 ships. However, both countries will jointly base their navies in the
96Viktor Kravchenko and Andrei Krylov, "Admiral Viktor Kravchenko: 'We Are Not Parting With
Sevastopol,'" Russian Press Digest Lexis-Nexis, June 20, 1997, (Pravda Five , 4).
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Streletskaya Bay—the key bay controlling the hydrographic region. The agreement also
assigns 1,020 military installations in Crimea as part of the necessary infrastructure to
support the fleet. The principal support units include the 8 10th Naval Infantry Brigade in
the Kazachya Bay; the 37th Rescue Ship Brigade and the 68th Harbor Defense Brigade in
the Streletskaya Bay; the special forces diver-training area and the fleet's 41st Guided-
Missile Boat Brigade in the Karantinnaya Bay; the Pirogov Military Hospital; the mine
and torpedo arsenal, the fleet's main ammunition arsenal (supposedly an entire city built
into the cliffs, with trucks driving around inside), and the Black Sea Fleet's missile base.
The lease also includes a testing center in Feodosia, an amphibious-landing training area at
Cape Opuk, and testing-center facilities in Chernomorsk and Pribrezhny. The fleet will
also utilize two military airfields: the Gvardeiskoye airfield and the Kacha airfield. 97 The
agreement limits the number of overall personnel to 25,000 Russian troops on Ukrainian
territory. Out of that number, naval, infantry and aviation soldiers will not exceed 1,987. 98
The agreement also limits the number of Russian vessels, armaments and equipment on
Ukrainian territory.
Moscow agreed to make a one-time infrastructure lease payment of $526 million
for the ships that Russia is buying back from Ukraine. The agreed-upon annual lease
97
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payment amounts to $98 million. Adding all future payments together, Moscow will pay
approximately $2.5 billion over the 20-year lease term. This does not alleviate the entire
Ukrainian debt, which is currently $3 billion. These compromises on debt and territory
offer the perception of a "zero option" for both sides; Russia gains basing rights and
Ukraine has a negligible debt."
E. THE FRIENDSHIP TREATY
With the signing of the Black Sea Fleet Agreement and the removal of the
stumbling blocks, President Yeltsin and President Kuchma signed the Treaty on
Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine on 3 1 May 1997.
This concludes a very important chapter of difficult and strained relations between the two
states. 100 The treaty codifies principles on the two countries' unconditional guarantees for
each other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. The treaty contains
guarantees that the two sides will build their relations on principles of the nonuse of force
or the threat of force, "including economic means of pressure." Basically, Moscow
promised Kiev that it will never again shut off the "gas valve" because of Ukraine's debts
and that it will not use economic pressure as a means to force Ukraine's decision making.
Articles 2 and 3 of the Friendship Treaty are the main articles that promise border
recognition and normalized relations.
""Fleet Accord Paves Way to Russia-Ukraine Treaty," 1. Koretsky, Yadukha, and Skachko, "The Prime
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Article 2. The High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the provisions
of the UN Charter and obligations under the Final Act of the Council for
Security and Collaboration in Europe, shall respect each other's territorial
integrity, and confirm the inviolability of the borders existing between
them.
Article 3 . The High Contracting Parties shall construct their relations with
each other on the basis of principles of mutual respect for sovereign
equality, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, the peaceful
settlement of disputes, the nonapplication of force, including economic and
other means of pressure, the right of peoples to decide their own fates
freely, nonintervention in internal affairs, the upholding of human rights and
basic freedoms, collaboration among nations, and the conscientious
fulfillment of international obligations assumed, as well as other generally
accepted norms of international law. 101
Volodymyr Horbulin, the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council,
emphasized that one of the greatest victories for Kiev is that neither the treaty nor the
Black Sea Fleet agreements prevent Ukraine from joining any military or military-political
alliance. Relations between the two independent states are now legally based on the
principle of "mutual respect, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, inviolability of
borders, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force or threat by force." 102 The
treaty will be in effect for ten years, with an automatic extension, and a requirement for
ratification by each country's parliament. 103
101Both articles come from the "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership Between Ukraine and
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F. CHANCES FOR RATIFICATION
Even with a signed Friendship Treaty, opponents continue to identify flaws in the
treaty and the Black Sea Fleet agreements. Konstantin Zatulin, Director of the Institute of
the CIS Countries emphasizes that Russia has given up any role in Crimea, abandoned any
defense for ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, and received no guarantees that Ukraine
won't join NATO. 104 For him, the only articles with any substance are Articles 2 and 3 in
which each side recognizes the territorial integrity and borders of the other. Moscow
Mayor Luzhkov continues to argue that Sevastopol is a Russian city and will always be a
Russian city. He called the Black Sea Fleet agreements a package of unacceptable
documents. 105
Georgy Tikhonov, Chairman of the State Duma's Committee on Affairs of the CIS
and Liaison With Compatriots, does not support ratification of the treaty. Tikhonov
believes that the entire Duma will vote against it. In his opinion, the Duma's stand against
Ukrainian independence stems from the threat ofNATO enlargement. If the Duma ratifies
the treaty, NATO will be able to offer Ukraine membership since the country will have no
territorial disputes with neighboring countries. It is Tikhonov' s opinion that since Russia
104"pjeet Accord Paves Way to Russia-Ukraine Treaty," Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press XLIX,
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signed the Friendship Treaty, NATO has an invitation to enlarge as far east as possible. 106
On the other hand, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov and State Duma Chairman
Gennady Seleznyov approve of the treaty and agreements, with some reservations. For
example, Zyuganov believes that "Russia and Ukraine should have a common fleet to
protect the two republics." 107
In Ukraine, some parties and associations have completely rejected the treaty and
agreements. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, along with the UNA-UNSDF
[Ukrainian National Assembly/Ukrainian National Self-Defense Forces] and the Ukrainian
People's Movement (Rukh), declared the Black Sea Fleet accords as "unconstitutional and
conflicting with the interests of the Ukrainian nation." 108 They called for legal action
against both presidents if the treaty and the agreement are in conflict with existing
legislation. Vyacheslav Chornovil, the leader of the Narodny Rukh movement, and other
Ukrainian parliamentarians advocate that "all foreign troops should be withdrawn from
Ukrainian territory by the year 2000. " 109 He vowed to call upon the nations of the Black
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"coastal line and territorial waters" 110 This action would greatly reduce the number and
location of Russian forces in the Crimea, particularly Sevastopol.
Nonetheless, it is possible that Russian and Ukrainian Parliaments will ratify the
treaty despite opposition in both states. Alexei Arbatov, Chairman of the Duma Defense
Committee, stated that the Russian parliament will ratify the treaty because of the
ramifications that would occur otherwise. Early in the negotiating process, Russia's
refusal to sign pushed Ukraine farther into the grip ofNATO and the west as a whole. If
the Duma refuses to ratify the treaty, the same would happen again. Ratification of the
treaty is a necessary step if Russia wishes to establish any normalized relations with
Ukraine. After accepting this inevitability, Federation Council Chairman Yegor Stroyev
stated in a media interview that "the upper chamber of the Russian parliament will approve
the wide-ranging treaty between Ukraine and Russia." 111
In Ukraine, the parliament's centrist parties and communist party favor ratification
of the treaty. Supreme Council Chairman Aleksandr Moroz supports ratification but
expects extensive debates over certain articles. Vladimir Gorbulin, Secretary of Ukraine's
National Security and Defense Council, endorses the treaty because it "removes all of
Russia's territorial claims against Ukraine." In his opinion, "for the first time, a foundation
110Ibid.
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has been laid for strategic partnership, which until now existed only on paper between
Ukraine and Russia." 112
G. UKRAINE'S ALLIANCES
On 9 July 1997, President Leonid Kuchma joined President Clinton, NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana, and the other NATO leaders in Madrid to sign a Charter
on a Distinctive NA TO-Ukraine Partnership. This became the capstone to Ukraine's
flurry of diplomatic activity. All these agreements firmly established Ukraine's identity as
a strong European state actor and affirmed support for Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity. This will launch Ukraine into the European mainstream.
Ukraine is simultaneously part of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe. It is a
member of the Central European Initiative and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Agreement. However, Ukraine is only an associate member of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). It is not a full member because it never signed the charter. It
has never supported the CIS superstructure objectives for "transparent internal" and
"jointly guarded" borders for all members. Ukraine's refusal of full membership has
actually prevented a new Cold War division through Europe. 113 Without Ukraine, Russia
cannot fully dominate the CIS Union and military-political balance in the region. As
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Ukraine subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire" 114 The CIS does not
have the ability to meet NATO enlargement head-on like the Warsaw Pact did. Russia
will emerge as a great power again, but it will not be a super-power which will challenge
the emerging post-Cold War balance of power.
Ukraine has resolved all its border frontiers in bilateral interstate treaties with its
neighbors. It can establish custom controls for the safety of its citizens because of current
legal codification of its borders. The drug and weapons trade represents a major threat to
the country. The border demarcation will help stem the flow into Central and Western
Europe. To date, Ukraine has confiscated 90 percent of the contraband, narcotics, and
illegal weapons that flow in from Russia. 115
Ukraine continues to maintain the position of a neutral and non-bloc state even
though the Constitution (June 1996) and the National Security Doctrine (January 1997)
both dropped any reference to neutrality. In 1992, 1995-96, and 1997, Ukraine refused
Russian offers for security guarantees such as those that NATO offers its members.
Currently, it is an associate member of the CIS, yet Kiev has rejected the stationing of
foreign troops on its territory. Nonetheless, Ukraine's reputation for a quality military has
continued to grow because of its activities under NATO in the former Yugoslavia.




for peacekeeping operations in their respective countries. These forces would go to
Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh to replace Russian or Russian proxy forces. 116
While taking into account the economic advantage of integration into Europe,
Ukraine regards cooperation with NATO, the EU, and the Central and East European
countries as a priority component of its national security. President Kuchma has stated
that the strategic goal of Ukraine is "to integrate into the European and Euro-Atlantic
structures, to establish gradually a special partnership with the European Union (EU),
NATO, and the Western European Union (WEU), and to be active in shaping a new
European security structure." 117 Ukraine wishes to join the fight against new global
threats: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, international
terrorism, organized crime, eco-terrorism, and illegal migration.
Through its policies, Ukraine evolved into a land bridge between Russia and
NATO. On 16 January 1997, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the National Security Policy
of Ukraine. One of the directives calls for Ukraine's "participation in universal and
regional security systems which exist already or are being established." 118 This does not
mean Ukraine wishes to join NATO. In fact, President Kuchma made a public statement
in August 1997 that Ukraine will not join NATO in the near future. This signaled to
Russia that with the conclusion of the Friendship Treaty Ukraine will not run to NATO's
116Ibid.
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118Ibid.,7.
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corner. However, Ukraine has consistently welcomed NATO's enlargement. Kiev views
NATO as "an alliance of democratic, peace-loving countries and one of the most effective
structures for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region." 119 NATO's defense
organization is important to Ukraine. Its political structure allows Ukraine to participate






As late as March 1 997, experts in Russian-Ukrainian relations predicted no
resolution to the problems that confronted these two states. In the long term, it was
thought that both parties might sign a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership.
However, in the short term, eight factors seem to explain why Russia was incapable of
signing the Friendship Treaty.
•First, without border recognition in a treaty, NATO could not invite Ukraine to
join as a member during the Madrid Summit in July 1997.
•Second, Boris Yeltsin's health prevented him from traveling to Ukraine to sign
the treaty, especially before the NATO conference in July 1997.
•Third, ifMoscow had really wanted to sign the treaty, it would have separated
the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol issues from the treaty and continued negotiations in
search of a suitable solution.
•Fourth, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's political party, Our Home is
Russia, regularly supported the State Duma's and Federation Council's claims on
Ukrainian territory, principally claiming Sevastopol as a Russian city. This suggested that
the issue had moved to the center of Russian policy from the fringes.
•Fifth, the Russian leadership did not denounce or criticize Mayor Luzhkov when
he traveled to Sevastopol against Ukraine's wishes.
•Sixth, Russians did not recognize Ukraine as a distinct ethnic group; from their
perspective, Ukraine should follow Belarus' s example for establishing close ties with
Moscow.
•Seventh, the recognition of Ukraine's borders would have further promoted
national unity. This might have allowed Ukraine to distance itself from a close relationship
with Russia, which would not have been in Moscow's best interests.
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•Eighth, Russia had not agreed to demarcate any borders with any of the CIS
states because Russia argued that "the CIS borders should be divided into 'transparent
internal' and 'jointly guarded external' borders." 120
All of these factors led the experts to underestimate the impact NATO enlargement would
have on Russia's decision-making.
The Friendship Treaty and Black Sea Fleet negotiations continued for nearly six
years almost without interruption. From late 1996, negotiations for a solution became
more intense. However, disagreements over the fleet's basing rights, the division of bays
at Sevastopol and mutual financial settlements were great stumbling blocks to a resolution.
The Black Sea Fleet problem and the absence of a treaty considerably complicated the
state of Russian-Ukrainian relations. The threat of pushing Ukraine into NATO's orbit, if
not its enlarging web of membership, became a direct influence on accelerating the search
for solutions.
Ukraine realized that it had to accept a deal as long as it did not appear that the
government had surrendered its territorial sovereignty or violated the constitution. 121
Kiev stood strong in its desire for independence and sought assurances from the
international community. Ukraine played the "NATO Trump Card." It continued leaning
120Taras Kuzio, "Eight Reasons Why Ukraine and Russia Will Not Sign Any Inter-State Treaty," 24
March 1997. Professor Kuzio includes all eight reasons that I have paraphrased. As part of my thesis,
Professor Kuzio's paper indicates the thinking of experts in the field as late as March 1997.
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toward the West by pursuing a special partnership agreement with NATO after refusing to
join a Russia-led security compact of former Soviet republics. 122 In the end, Ukraine
achieved a short-term renewable lease, real compensation for the lease payments and debt
relief, unambiguous Ukrainian sovereignty over the port and city of Sevastopol, and
continued access to Crimean facilities for the Ukrainian navy. 123
Yeltsin's change in foreign policy objectives helped conclude these agreements.
He concluded a peace settlement with Chechnya in order to liquidate the war that was
sapping Russia's power and prestige. In Minsk, he established a relationship which Russia
sees as leading to a union. In Paris, he secured the Russia-NATO Founding Act because
Russia had to agree to what was going to happen anyway with the best conditions
possible. Finally, Yeltsin worked with Kiev, for it is precisely there, as Clinton rightly
pointed out in May 1995, that the fate of European security would be decided.
The agreement with Ukraine, especially concerning the Black Sea Fleet and
Sevastopol, should have been signed long ago. But starting in the spring of 1995, the
repeated visits of Western leaders to Kiev and Ukraine's movement politically and
militarily toward the West made Ukrainian-Russian relations a loaded political issue in
Moscow. During the 1996 presidential elections, Yeltsin simply could not have allowed
122Susan Sachs, "2 Giants in Awkward Embrace/For Ukraine, Separation from Russia Strains Kinship,
Newsdav . June 11, 1997, p. A20.
123 Garnett, "U.S. National-Security Interests in Crimea," 203.
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himself to sign such an agreement without great political damage. Subsequently, the
president's illness brought about a six-month lull in progress. 124
Nonetheless, the timing of the treaty coincided with the Madrid Summit in July
1997 and NATO's decision to invite three countries for membership. This definitively
signaled to Moscow that NATO was serious about expanding. In order to avoid the loss
of additional countries in the enlargement, Russia needed to offer an olive branch of peace
and regional security to Ukraine. Otherwise, Russia's reluctance to sign the treaty would
have pushed Ukraine further and further west.
Other factors could have contributed to, or actually triggered, the signing of the
treaty.
•First, President Yeltsin simply could have decided to buy time before
implementing a dramatic military reform. Russia would have to execute a mobilization
program similar to that in World War II if it had to fight another war today. The nation
requires time, probably no less than twenty years of peace, to establish the necessary
systems for rebuilding its military. The Russian military currently suffers from a much
worse case of demoralization than the American military did after Vietnam.
•Second, Russia wants to prevent Turkish domination of the Black Sea. Without
an active Black Sea Fleet, Russia will not be able to provide coastal defense along its
borders. Russia needs a naval presence to secure the shipping of oil from the pipelines
that will extend from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea.
•Third, NATO enlargement may have been a coincidence and Russia planned to
sign the Friendship Treaty the entire time. Security Council Secretary Rybkin stated that
all the agreements concluded in May 1997 were necessary to improve Russia's security
and that the only threat to its security comes from inside the country: drugs, organized
crime, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. President Yeltsin needs neighborly
relations on the periphery while he attempts to stabilize the domestic situation.
124IrinaKobrinskaya, "Keeping Kiev Friendly," The Moscow Times Lexis-Nexis, (7 June 1997), 1.
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In the end, Russian leaders may have realized that the hard-line approach toward
Ukraine was not working. It strengthened Ukrainian elites in their resistance to Russian
domination and pushed Ukraine into the arms of the West. Possibly it is felt that a soft-
line approach, signing the Friendship Treaty and recognizing Ukraine's sovereignty, may
eventually erode Ukrainian unity and achieve Russia's goal for political and economic
dominance over Ukraine. Ukraine's economy is still in the midst of transition.
Disillusionment with Ukraine's democracy eventually may initiate separatist movements.
A large Russian population and potential disunity among Ukrainian elites make this soft
approach a viable option.
With the conclusion of the treaty, the current situation begs the questions—Will
Central and Eastern Europe have regional stability and does Russia psychologically accept
Ukraine's independence? Only time will tell. However, the Friendship Treaty and Black
Sea Fleet Agreements provide the necessary foundation for both states to build a solid,
long-term, and stable relationship. The Friendship Treaty codifies the principles for each
country to respect the other's territorial integrity and borders. The Black Sea Fleet
Agreement provides a mechanism for both countries to rebuild their navies. Nonetheless,
for better or worse, Russia has recognized Ukraine's independence.
A "big agreement" in Kiev or a "founding act" in Paris cannot solve all the
problems of regional stability and future Russian-Ukrainian relations. Kiev and Moscow
will have to carry out painstaking, "small-step" policies that restore political trust and turn
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economic cooperation into a plank of Russian-Ukrainian relations and that establish
trustworthy, secure, and positive cooperation with NATO and its members. 125
A humorous anecdote closes this thesis and illustrates the psychology that will
complicate future relations between "these two Slav giants that have been locked in a
sometimes stifling, sometimes fraternal embrace, for all of their recorded history." A
Russian and a Ukrainian find $1,000 on the street. The Russian turns to his buddy and
says: "Let's split it like brothers!" The Ukrainian shakes his head and responds, "No
thanks. Let's split it 50-50." 126
125
Ibid.
126Sachs, "2 Giants in Awkward Embrace/For Ukraine, Separation from Russia Strains Kinship.
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APPENDIX. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION, AND
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN UKRAINE AND THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
Ukraine and the Russian Federation, hereinafter the "High Contracting Parties,"
relying on the close ties and the relations of friendship and collaboration that have
historically existed between the peoples of Ukraine and Russia, acknowledging that the
Treaty Between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR of 19 November 1990 has fostered the
development of good- neighbor relations between both nations, affirming their own
obligations that arise out of the provisions of the Treaty Between Ukraine and the Russian
Federation for the Further Development of International Relations that was signed at
Dagomys on 23 June 1992, considering that the strengthening of fraternal relations, good-
neighbor relations, and mutually advantageous collaboration meets the fundamental
interests of their peoples and serves the cause of peace and international security, striving
to impart a new quality to those relations and strengthen their legal basis, being filled with
resolve to ensure the irreversibility and consistency of democratic processes in both
nations, taking into account agreements within the framework of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, and affirming their own adherence to the norms of international law,
and first of all to the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter, and upholding the
obligations that have been adopted within the framework of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, have agreed to the following:
Article 1
.
The High Contracting Parties, as fraternal, equal, and sovereign nations, shall
base their relations on mutual respect and trust, strategic partnership, and collaboration.
Article 2. The High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the provisions of the UN
Charter and obligations under the Final Act of the Council for Security and Collaboration
in Europe, shall respect each other's territorial integrity, and confirm the inviolability of
the borders existing between them.
Article 3 . The High Contracting Parties shall construct their relations with each other on
the basis of principles of mutual respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity, the
inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the nonapplication of force,
including economic and other means of pressure, the right of peoples to decide their own
fates freely, nonintervention in internal affairs, the upholding of human rights and basic
freedoms, collaboration among nations, and the conscientious fulfillment of international
obligations assumed, as well as other generally accepted norms of international law.
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Article 4. The High Contracting Parties shall proceed from the fact that good-neighbor
relations and collaboration between them are important factors in raising stability and
security in Europe and around the world. They shall exercise close collaboration in order
to strengthen international peace and security. They shall take essential steps to promote
the process of general disarmament and the creation and strengthening of a system of
collective security in Europe, as well as to strengthen the peacekeeping role of the UN and
increase the effectiveness of regional security mechanisms. The parties shall make every
effort to see that the settlement of all disputed issues is accomplished exclusively by
peaceful means, and shall collaborate in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and
situations that affect their interests.
Article 5. The High Contracting Parties shall hold regular consultations in order to ensure
the further expansion of bilateral relations and an exchange of opinions with regard to
multilateral problems of mutual interest. They shall coordinate their positions where
necessary to implement joint actions. Regular high-level meetings shall be held for this
purpose by agreement of the Parties. The ministers of foreign affairs of the Parties shall
meet not less often than twice a year. Working meetings between representatives of other
ministries and agencies of the Parties to discuss issues of mutual interest shall be held as
necessary. The Parties may create combined commissions on a permanent or ad hoc basis
to resolve particular issues in various fields.
Article 6. Each of the High Contracting Parties shall refrain from participation in or
support of any actions directed against the other High Contracting Party, and is obligated
not to enter into any agreements with any countries directed against the other Party.
Neither of the Parties shall also permit its territory to be used to the detriment of the
security of the other Party.
Article 7. In the event a situation arises that, in the opinion of one of the High Contracting
Parties, creates a threat to peace, disrupts the peace, or affects the interests of its national
security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, it may propose immediate consultations to
the other Party. The Parties shall exchange the appropriate information, and where
necessary take coordinated or joint steps, in order to overcome such a situation.
Article 8. The High Contracting Parties shall develop their relations in the spheres of
military and military-technical collaboration and national security, as well as their
collaboration on border issues, customs, export and immigration controls, on the basis of
separate treaties.
Article 9. The High Contracting Parties, affirming their resolve to proceed in the direction
of cutting back armed forces and weaponry, shall promote the process of disarmament and
act together in the unwavering fulfillment of agreements in the area of cutting back armed
forces and weaponry, including nuclear.
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Article 10. Each of the High Contracting Parties guarantees to the citizens of the other
Party rights and freedoms on the same grounds and in the same amounts as their own
citizens, aside from cases stipulated by the national legislation of the Parties or other
international treaties. Each of the Parties protects the rights of its own citizens residing on
the territory of the other Party under established procedure in accordance with their
obligations under the documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe and other generally accepted principles and norms of international law and




The High Contracting Parties shall take all necessary steps on their territory,
including the passage of the appropriate legislation, to avert and curtail any actions that
are an instigation to violence or violence against certain individuals or groups of citizens
based on national, racial, ethnic, or religious intolerance.
Article 12. The High Contracting Parties shall ensure the protection of the ethnic, cultural,
linguistic, and religious originality of national minorities on their territory, and create
conditions for the encouragement of that originality. Each of the High Contracting Parties
shall guarantee the right of individuals belonging to national minorities to express,
safeguard, and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious originality, either
individually or along with other individuals that belong to national minorities, and to
maintain and develop their culture without suffering any attempts at assimilation against
their will.
The High Contracting Parties shall guarantee the right of individuals that belong to
national minorities to exercise their human rights and basic freedoms entirely and
effectively, and to enjoy them without any discrimination whatsoever and under conditions
of complete equality under the law.
The High Contracting Parties shall promote the creation of equal opportunities and
conditions for the study of the Ukrainian language in the Russian Federation and the
Russian language in Ukraine and the training of teaching personnel for instruction in those
languages at educational institutions, and shall provide state support of equal value for
that purpose.
The High Contracting Parties shall enter into agreements for collaboration on these
issues.
Article 13. The High Contracting Parties shall develop equal and mutually advantageous
collaboration in economics, and refrain from actions that could cause economic harm to
each other. For that purpose, acknowledging the necessity of the gradual formation and
development of an overall economic expanse by means of the creation of conditions for
the free movement of foods, services, capital, and manpower, the Parties shall take
effective steps to coordinate their strategies for implementing economic reforms,
deepening economic integration on the basis of mutual advantage, and harmonizing
economic legislation.
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The High Contracting Parties shall ensure the broad exchange of economic
information and access to it for enterprises, businessmen, and scholars of both Parties.
The Parties shall strive to coordinate their financial, monetary, credit, budgetary, currency,
investment, pricing, taxation, trade, and economic policies, as well as customs policies, for
the creation of equal possibilities and guarantees for business entities, and promote the
formation and development of direct economic and trade relations at all levels, the
specialization and cooperation of technologically associated types of production,
enterprises, associations, corporations, banks, producers, and consumers of products.
The High Contracting Parties shall promote the preservation and development of
production, scientific and technical cooperation among industrial enterprises on a mutually
advantageous basis in the development and production of modern and scientifically
sophisticated products, including products for defense needs.
Article 14. The High Contracting Parties shall provide favorable conditions for direct trade
and other economic relations and collaboration at the level of territorial administrative
entities in accordance with prevailing national legislation, paying particular attention to the
development of the economic ties of the border regions.
Article 15. The High Contracting Parties shall provide favorable economic, financial, and
legal conditions for the business and other economic activity of enterprises and
organizations of the other Party, including incentives and mutual protection of their
investments. The Parties shall encourage various forms of cooperation and direct ties
between the business entities of both nations, regardless of the forms of ownership.
Article 16. The High Contracting Parties shall interact within the UN and other
international organizations and support each other in the entry into international
organizations and accession to treaties and conventions to which one of the Parties is not a
signatory.
Article 17. The High Contracting Parties shall expand their collaboration in the area of
transport, and provide freedom of transit of individuals, freight, and transport across each
other's territory in accordance with generally accepted norms of international law.
The shipment of freight and passengers by rail, air, sea, river, and motor transport between
the two Parties and transit across their territory, including operations through sea and river
ports and airports, rail and highway systems, as well as operations through lines of
communications, trunk pipelines and electrical grids located on the territory of the other
Party, are accomplished in accordance with the procedure and on the terms stipulated by
separate agreements.
Article 18. The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate in search and air-rescue
operations, as well as in the investigation of transport incidents.
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Article 19. The High Contracting Parties shall ensure adherence to the legal conditions of
state property and the property of legal entities and citizens of one of the High
Contracting Parties located on the territory of the other High Contracting Party in
accordance with the legislation of that Party, if not otherwise stipulated by agreement
between the Parties.
The Parties shall proceed from the fact that questions of ownership relations that
affect their interests are subject to settlement on the basis of separate agreements.
Article 20. The High Contracting Parties shall devote particular attention to the
development of collaboration to provide for the functioning of the national fuel and power
complexes, transport systems, and information and communications systems, promoting
the preservation, efficient utilization, and development of the complexes and individual
systems that have taken shape in those fields.
Article 21. The High Contracting Parties, on the basis of separate agreements, shall
cooperate in studying and utilizing outer space and in the joint production and
development of missile and space hardware based on principles of equality and mutual
advantage and in accordance with international law.
The High Contracting Parties shall promote the preservation and development of
the cooperative ties that have taken shape among the enterprises of the missile and space
sector.
Article 22. The High Contracting Parties shall provide mutual assistance during the clean-
up of accidents that arise as a result of incidents on lines of communication,
trunk pipelines, power systems, road networks, and other facilities of mutual interest.
The procedure for interaction when conducting emergency and recovery operations is
defined by separate agreements.
Article 23. The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate in the fields of education,
science and technology and in the development of research activity, encouraging direct ties
among their scientific research organizations and the implementation ofjoint programs and
projects, especially in the sphere of modern technology. Questions of the utilization of the
results ofjoint research obtained in the course of collaboration shall be agreed upon in
each specific instance by separate agreements.
The Parties shall interact in the area of the training of personnel, and encourage the
exchange of specialists, scientists, graduate students, interns, and students. They shall
mutually recognize the equivalence of educational documents, academic degrees, and
academic titles, and shall enter into a separate agreement on this issue.
The Parties shall exchange scientific and technical information, as well as
collaborate on issues of the protection of copyrights and allied rights and other types of
intellectual property, in accordance with the national legislation and international
obligations of their countries in those areas.
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Article 24. The High Contracting Parties shall develop collaboration in the areas of
culture, literature, the arts, mass media, tourism, and sports.
The Parties shall interact in the safekeeping, restoration, and use of their historical and
cultural heritage.
The Parties shall promote to the utmost the strengthening and expansion of
creative exchange and interaction among collectives, organizations, and associations of
figures in literature and the arts, cinematography, film production, and the archival affairs
of their countries, the holding of traditional national cultural days, arts festivals and
exhibitions, tours of creative ensembles and soloists, the exchange of delegations of
cultural figures and specialists at the state, regional, and local levels, and the organization
of national cultural centers on the territory of both nations.
The Parties shall provide state support in the development and realization ofjoint
programs for the resurrection and development of the tourist industry, the assimilation of
new and promising recreational zones, and the safeguarding, restoration, and efficient
utilization of cultural, historical, and religious artifacts and sites. A strengthening of the
contacts among sports organizations and clubs and the joint holding of international
sporting functions shall be encouraged in all-round fashion. The Parties shall jointly
develop and realize mutually advantageous programs for the development of the material
and technical base of television and radio, including satellite broadcasting, and provide for
the organization of television and radio programs in the Russian language in Ukraine and
the Ukrainian language in Russia on an equal basis.
The Parties shall promote the development of contacts among people, political
parties, and social movements, trade unions, religious organizations and associations, and
health, sports, tourist, and other associations and unions. The whole set of issues
envisioned by this article are the subject of separate agreements.
Article 25. The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate in the protection and
improvement of the state of the environment, the prevention of cross-border pollution, the
efficient and resource- conserving utilization of the environment, and dealing with the
consequences of emergency situations of natural and man-made origin, and shall promote
coordinated actions in this field at the regional and global levels, striving to create an all-
encompassing system of international ecological security.
The Parties shall proceed from the fact that the protection of the environment and
ecological security, including the protection and utilization of ecosystems and resources of
the Dnieper River and other cross-border water flows and actions in emergency ecological
situations, are subject to regulation on the basis of separate agreements.
Article 26. The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate in dealing with the
consequences of the accident at the Chornobyl AES [nuclear electric power plant], and
shall enter into a separate agreement on that issue.
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Article 27. The High Contracting Parties shall develop collaboration in the area of social
protections, including the social security of citizens. They shall enter into special
agreements for the purpose of resolving issues of labor relations, job placement, social
protections, compensation for damages caused by disability or other damage to health
associated with production accidents, social security for citizens of one Party engaged in
labor activity or have served work time on the territory of the other Party, and on other
issues in this sphere that require coordinated solutions.
The Parties shall ensure the unrestricted and timely transfer of pensions, monetary
assistance, alimony, funds as compensation for damages caused by disability or other harm
to health, and other socially significant payments to citizens of one of the Parties who
reside permanently or are temporarily present on the territory of the other Party.
Article 28. The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate on issues of restoring the rights
of deported peoples in accordance with agreements within the framework of the CIS on a
bilateral and multilateral basis.
Article 29. The High Contracting Parties, as Black Sea nations, are prepared and shall in
the future develop comprehensive collaboration in matters of rescue and safeguarding of
the Azov- Black Sea basin environment, the performance of marine and climatic research,
the use of recreational opportunities and the natural resources of the Black and Azov
Seas, and the development of navigation and the operation of naval lines of
communications, ports, and structures.
Article 30. The High Contracting Parties are aware of the importance to Ukraine and the
Russian Federation of preserving a technologically integrated system for the gathering,
processing, dissemination, and utilization of hydrometeorological information and data on
the state of the environment to meet the interests of the public and the national economy,
and will comprehensively promote the development of collaboration in the area of
hydrometeorology and environmental monitoring.
Article 3 1 . The High Contracting Parties shall devote particular attention to the
development of mutually advantageous collaboration in the area of health care and
the improvement of the health-safety and epidemiological situation, the production of
medicines and medical equipment, and the training of highly skilled personnel for the
medical facilities of the Parties.
Article 32. The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate in resolving issues of the
regulation of migration processes, including measures to prevent and disallow illegal
migration from third countries, for which a separate agreement shall be drawn up.
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Article 33. The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate in the fight against crime, first
and foremost against organized crime and terrorism in all of its forms and manifestations,
including criminal acts directed against the security of maritime shipping, civil aviation,
and other types of transport, and the illegal circulation of radioactive materials, weaponry,
drugs, and psychotropic substances, contraband, including the illegal movement across
borders of objects that are of cultural, historical, or artistic value.
Article 34. The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate in the legal sphere on the basis
of separate agreements.
Article 35. The High Contracting Parties shall promote the development of contacts and
collaboration between the parliaments and among the parliamentarians of both nations.
Article 36. This Treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting
Parties that arise from other international treaties to which they are signatories.
Article 37. Disputes related to the interpretation and application of the provisions of this
Treaty are subject to settlement by means of consultations and negotiations between the
High Contracting Parties.
Article 38. The High Contracting Parties shall enter into other agreements with each other
as necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty, as well as agreements in areas of
mutual interest.
Article 39. This Treaty is subject to ratification, and shall take effect on the day of
exchange of letters of ratification.
The Treaty Between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Russian
Soviet Federal Socialist Republic of 19 November 1990 shall be terminated as of the day
this Treaty enters into force.
Article 40. This Treaty is entered into for a period often years. It will then be extended
automatically for subsequent ten- year periods if one of the High Contracting Parties does
not inform the other High Contracting Party of its intention to curtail it by written
notification not less than six months before the end of the current 10-year period.
Article 41. This Treaty is subject to registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations
in accordance with Article 102 of the UN Charter.
Executed in the city of Kiev on 3 1 May 1997 in two copies, one each in the Ukrainian and
Russian languages, with both texts being authentic.
For Ukraine, for the Russian Federation
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